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I. INTRODUCTION: "OUR FEDERALISM" 
One of the most important but often overlooked influences on Ameri-
can family law is what the Supreme Court quaintly calls "Our Federalism."l 
The content and structure of family law in the United States have been 
profoundly shaped by the fact that the "regulation of domestic relations [is] 
an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the 
states," as the Supreme Court put it thirty years ago.2 The doctrine of feder-
alism in family law is one of the oldest surviving original doctrines of con-
stitutionallaw in American legal history. That is both arguably a strength 
and a weakness. It is a strength because it is so well-established and long-
recognized that it has been a source of some stability in intergovernmental 
responsibility boundaries, and of decentralization resulting in doctrinal di-
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 
84602. The valuable research assistance of Justin W. Starr, Brinton Wilkins, and Kojo Ampiall-
Davis, and the production assistance of Marcene Mason is gratefully acknowledged. Presented at 
the University of St. Thomas Law Journal Fall Symposium, The Federal Marriage Amendment: 
Yes or No?, September 24,2004, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. A portion of an earlier draft of this 
work was presented at the International Society of Family Law North American Regional Confer-
ence in Eugene, Oregon, June 26-28, 2003. 
1. The term "Our Federalism" has been used by the Supreme Court in a variety of contexts 
to reflect a principle of constitutionally required and comity-inspired deference by the national 
government to the States. Justice Black gave one classic application (in abstention) and explana-
tion of it as 
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is 
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that 
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to 
perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better 
and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one 
familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence 
is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our 
Federalism." 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
2. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). 
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versity. However, it is a weakness because it reflects the regional situation 
of a day long past and it has been an impediment to various efforts to 
achieve national uniformity in family law, including post-modem aspira-
tions for uniformity on issues deemed critical for coherent deconstruction-
ism. Thus, it is not surprising that there have been a number of cases in 
recent years in which application of, or disregard for, the doctrine of feder-
alism in family law has produced significant controversy? 
The latest controversy, just beginning to boil, concerns efforts to legal-
ize same-sex "marriage." Many proponents of same-sex marriage have ag-
gressively invoked several provisions of the U.S. Constitution and asserted 
that the states are required to legalize or to recognize same-sex marriage or 
quasi-marital unions. Thus, for example, it has been asserted that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause will-or does-compel states to recognize same-
sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships that are entered into 
in other states where they are lawfully formed4 (and that state and federal 
laws directing otherwise are unconstitutional);5 that the Equal Protection 
3. For example, application of the doctrine of federalism to invalidate a provision of the 
federal Violence Against Women Act, which created a federal cause of action for victims of rape 
and other gender violence, caused a great deal of commotion: See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). 
4. In addition to these relatively plausible claims, some advocates of constitutionally requir-
ing same-sex marriage have urged that it is required by the Free Speech (Expression) Clause, 
Establishment Clause, and even the Free Exercise Clause. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it 
Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource; 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
925 (2001); Mark Strasser, Toleration, Approval, and the Right to Marry: On Constitutional Limi-
tations and Preferential Treatment, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 65, 78 (2001) (arguing that an "endorse-
ment test should preclude the state from denying individuals the right to marry because it wants to 
tell those individuals that they are outsiders who are not full members of the community"); Mark 
Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional 
Guarantees, 33 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 597, 629 (2002) (arguing that "for some couples, [same-sex] 
unions must be recognized because of the Free Exercise guarantees of the Federal Constitution"); 
see also James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Chris-
tianity, 4 Mich. J. Gender & L. 335 (1997); but see Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and 
the Public Policy Doctrine, 32Creighton L. Rev. 45 (1998) (arguing that claims that limit mar-
riage to heterosexual couples violates Equal Protection are unfounded). See infra Part V.c. 
5. Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 
Ky. L.J. 1075 (2000-01) (arguing that under most circumstances civil unions performed in Ver-
mont must be recognized in other states under principles of full faith and credit); Thomas M. 
Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 499 (1995) (arguing that full faith and credit, fundamental inter-
est in marriage, and right to travel all support recognition of same-sex marriages); Larry Kramer, 
Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 
Yale LJ. 1965 (1997) (arguing that the traditional "public policy" exception to marriage recogni-
tion is an unconstitutional violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and that, therefore, same-
sex marriages must be recognized by sister states in many circumstances); Mark Strasser, The 
Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 
Rutgers L. Rev. 553 (2000) (arguing that a state's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages vio-
lates the fundamental right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Roderick T. 
Chen & Alexandra K. Glazier, Can Same-Sex Partners Consent to Organ Donation?, 29 Am. J.L. 
& Med. 31, 42 (2003) (noting the strong support for the argument that domestic partnerships 
should be given recognition under full faith and credit). 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to treat same-sex un-
ions the same as heterosexual unions for purpose of access to marriage sta-
tus and benefits;6 and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires states to allow the celebration of same-sex 
"marriages. "7 
Some opponents of same-sex marriage have introduced in Congress a 
proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (hereinafter "Amendment" or 
"FMA"). This amendment would constitutionally define marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman only, would strip the national and state gov-
ernments of the power to legalize same-sex "marriage," and would strip 
federal and state courts of the power to create or extend legal status and 
benefits to same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships, but would leave 
state legislatures with the power to create civil unions, domestic partner-
ships, or extend some government benefits to same-sex couples.8 
What both the advocates of same-sex marriage and the supporters of 
the FMA appear to have in common is their desire to decide the same-sex 
marriage issue at the national level, and to override, circumvent, or modify 
the doctrine of federalism in family law. Advocates of gay marriage do so 
on the ground that the merits and substantive principles for same-sex mar-
riage are so important that they must be established at the national level, 
must override federalism in family law, and that gay and lesbian couples 
who marry or enter into lawful "civil unions" in one state must not be de-
nied the status and benefits associated with that union if they move to other 
states. They ordinarily manifest little respect for the doctrine of federalism 
in family law, but when the issue of the Federal Marriage Amendment is 
raised, they raise federalism objections. On the other hand, supporters of 
the Federal Marriage Amendment also argue that the issue of the definition 
of marriage is foundational, important to the survival of the nation, that it 
should be preserved as matter of constitutional law, and to the extent that 
federalism in family law would be reduced-as to the ability of any state to 
define marriage as including gay or lesbian couples-it is an acceptable 
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1419, 1423-26 
(1993) (noting the equal protection arguments in favor of same-sex marriage); Sherri L. Toussaint, 
Defense of Marriage Act: Isn't It Ironic . .. Don't You Think? A Little Too Ironic?, 76 Neb. L. 
Rev. 924, 935-49 (1997) (arguing that prohibitions on same-sex marriage are no different than 
prohibitions of interracial marriages struck down in Loving v. Virginia). 
7. Veronica C. Abreu, Student Author, The Malleable Use of History in Substantive Due 
Process Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply Rooted" Test Should Not Be a Barrier to Finding the 
Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 
B.C. L. Rev. 177, 204 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence "can 
accommodate same-sex marriage as a fundamental right"); but see Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 
A.2d 307,331 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,57 (Haw. 1993) (finding that there is no 
due process fundamental right to same-sex marriage). The "due process" ruling in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), probably will be invoked by advocates of same-sex marriage. See 
infra nn. 114-19 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra nn. 78-83 and accompanying text. 
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cost. They usually support federalism and state control of family law issues, 
but when the Federal Marriage Amendment is mentioned, they assert that 
federalism in family law is already a dead letter, that liberal federal and 
state court judges already frequently disregard the doctrine, and that judicial 
activists are on the verge of judicially imposing same-sex marriage on the 
states despite the doctrine of family federalism. Thus, they argue that a 
minor reduction of federalism in family law is necessary to save and rein-
vigorate the core, underlying federalism principle. 9 
For students of family law as well as of federalism this is a very signif-
icant issue. Apart from the merits of the substantive issue-whether same-
sex "marriage" should be legalized or absolutely banned in the United 
States-the question about the scope and survival of the doctrine of federal-
ism in family law may have very far reaching consequences for both family 
law and structural constitutionalism in the United States. 
In this paper, I explore this narrow, structural, constitutional issue con-
cerning federalism in family law and the proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment. One's analysis certainly may be influenced by prior thinking 
and writing about federalism and/or same-sex marriage, and I have written 
extensively and supportively about federalism in family law.lO However, 
the principle of federalism in family law is particularly difficult to pigeon-
hole into convenient ideological categories, and application of that principle 
to the debate over the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment is very com-
plex and controversial. For example, conservative opposition to the pro-
posed Federal Marriage Amendment because it does not go far enough to 
outlaw all same-sex unions seems to be just as vigorous as conservative 
support for it because it would abolish same-sex marriage. 11 Both advo-
cates and opponents of same-sex marriage have criticized the proposed Fed-
9. See infra nn. 125-30 and accompanying text. 
10. As a matter of general principle, I generally support and have written in defense of the 
constitutional doctrine of federalism in family law, and I generally oppose and have written in 
opposition to the legalization of same-sex marriage. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical 
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. I (1996) [herein-
after Wardle, A Critical Analysis]; Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts 
to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 735 (1998) 
[hereinafter Wardle, Legal.Claims for Same-Sex Marriage]; Lynn D. Wardle, DOMA: Protecting 
Federalism in Family Law, 45 Fed. Law. 30 (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Wardle, DOMA]; Lynn D. 
Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 
32 Creighton L. Rev. 187 (1998) [hereinafter Wardle, Divorce Recognition]; Lynn D. Wardle, 
"Multiply and Replenish": ConSidering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital 
Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & PUb. Policy 771 (2001) [hereinafter Wardle, Multiply and Replen-
ish]; Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on 
Family Law, II Widener J. Pub. L. 401 (2002) [hereinafter Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil 
Unions]. See further H.R. Subcomm. on the Const. of the Jud. Comm., Sen. 1740, Defense of 
Marriage Act, 104th Congo (May 15, 1996) Lib. Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/; path 
Search Bills and Resolutions, select Summary and 104th Cong., search Defense of Marriage Act 
(prepared statement of Professor Lynn D. Wardle). 
11. See infra pt. II.E. 
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eral Marriage Amendment for its abandonment of federalism principles, 12 
while supporters of the proposed amendment argue that it is the last, best 
hope to rescue some form of family law federalism from judicial activism. 13 
In June 2003, I presented a paper at the International Society of Family 
Law North American Regional Conference in Eugene, Oregon, in which I 
explained why I did not support the proposed Federal Marriage Amend-
ment, primarily because of my concerns about preserving federalism in 
family law. 14 In this article, I explain why I do support the proposed Fed-
eral Marriage Amendment, primarily for exactly the same reason that fif-
teen months ago I opposed it-because of my concerns about preserving 
federalism in family law. The events of the past fifteen months have con-
vinced me that federalism in family law is in much greater jeopardy from 
the legal arguments, positions, and tactics asserted by advocates of legaliz-
ing same-sex marriage than from the Federal Marriage Amendment; that 
one way or another federalism in family law is going to be altered; and that 
the Federal Marriage Amendment will preserve much more fully and faith-
fully the constitutional principle of federalism in family law. 
Part II of this article describes the proposed Federal Marriage Amend-
ment, reviews the history of it, and summarizes the arguments that have 
thus far been made for and against its adoption, emphasizing especially 
those that relate to federalism in family law. I assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and show how 
crucial the vitality of the doctrine of federalism in family law may be to 
determining whether the Federal Marriage Amendment should be 
supported. 
Part III of this article briefly describes the constitutional history of the 
origins of the doctrine of federalism in family law. Federalism in family 
law was understood and universally accepted because there were no per-
ceived substantial threats to the family or to the institution of marriage in 
1787. To address threats to and abuses of highly valued rights and rela-
tions, the Founders identified those rights and relations for fundamental 
protection in the Constitution or Bill of Rights, and empowered the national 
government to provide national protection. Thus, the FMA would appear to 
fit into the overall federalist structure of the Constitution. 
In Part IV, the extent to which federalism in family law survives as a 
viable operative constitutional doctrine-rather than a mere label invoked 
or applied for convenience or effect-is considered. The erosion of the doc-
trine of federalism in family law in judicial decisions and increasing con-
gressionallegislation is reviewed. Also, because the validity of, especially, 
the federal and state Defense of Marriage Acts (hereinafter "DOMAs") is 
12. See infra pt. II.E. 
13. See infra pt. II.D. 
14. Lynn D. Wardle, Address, Federalism in Family Law and the Proposed Federal Mar-
riage Amendment (Eugene, Or., June 27, 2003) (copy in author's possession). 
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briefly noted, as that is directly relevant to the necessity for adoption of the 
proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. 
In Part V, the lessons from the constitutional origins of federalism in 
family law are applied to the controversy over the proposed Federal Mar-
riage Amendment. Those lessons are considered in light of recent develop-
ments in the legalization of same-sex marriage, the apparent waning of 
judicial respect for federalism in family law, and Supreme Court decisions 
that already have constitutionalized some aspects of marriage regulation by 
imposing limits on how the states may define and regulate marriage. 
Finally, in Part VI, this article concludes by asserting that the doctrine 
of federalism in family law should be preserved and strengthened, and that 
the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment will do that, and that to adopt 
the FMA poses less threat to federalism in family law than to not adopt it. 
If the FMA is not adopted, federalism in family law will become extinct, 
buried by the national imposition of same-sex marriage on the states by 
agressive extension of various constitutional doctrines. 
II. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
A. Text and a Short History of the Proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment 
The Federal Marriage Amendment was introduced in the House of 
Representatives on May 15, 2002, as H.R. Jt. Res. 93,15 and was reintro-
duced May 21, 2003 as H.R. Jt. Res. 56. 16 The full text of the proposed 
Federal Marriage Amendment is just two sentences: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a 
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution 
of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require 
that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
unmarried couples or groups. 17 
The FMA was sponsored by six House members, three Democrats and 
three Republicans, when it was introduced initially in the 107th Congress, 
15. H.R. Jt. Res. 93, 107th Congo (May 15, 2002); see generally Press Statement, Alliance 
for Marriage, Introduction of the Federal Marriage Amendment in Congress (May 15, 2002) 
(available at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/sitelPageServer?pagenarne=mac_coalition_state-
ment) (accessed Mar. 13, 2005); Stephanie Francis Cahill, In the News, Between a Man and a 
Woman: Federal Marriage Amendment Would Ban Same-Sex Marriages, 1 No. 20 ABA J. E-
Report 5 (May 24, 2002). 
16. H.R. Jt. Res. 56, 108th Congo (May 21, 2003). It was introduced by Representative 
Marilyn Musgrave (R-Colo.) for herself, Mr. Hall (D-Tex.), Mr. McIntyre (D-N.C.), Mr. Peterson 
(D-Minn.), Mrs. Jo Ann Davis (R-Va.) and Mr. Vitter (R-La.). Press Release, Alliance for Mar-
riage, Multicultural Coalition Reintroduces Federal Marriage Amendment in Congress '113, http:// 
www.allianceformarriage.org/sitelPageserver?pagename=macjma (accessed Mar. 13, 2005). 
17. H.R. Jt. Res. 56, 108th Congo (May 21, 2003); see also Alliance for Marriage, Multicul-
tural Marriage Coalition Introduces the Federal Marriage Amendment in Congress with Bi-Parti-
san Support http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fmalfma.htm (accessed May 19, 2003). 
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and when it was reintroduced again in 2003.18 It was expected to be reintro-
duced in the 108th Congress, with more than twenty co-sponsors, but there 
reportedly was strong cloakroom opposition,19 and only six House co-spon-
sors (again, three from each major political party) initially signed up as co-
sponsors with Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-Colo.) for H.R. Jt. Res. 56 when 
it was introduced May 21, 2003.20 However, after the decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,21 holding that laws prohibiting sod-
omy are unconstitutional and irrational; the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court decisions in Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health,22 declaring the 
Massachusetts marriage law allowing only male-female marriages unconsti-
tutionally irrational, and in Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,23 declar-
ing that civil unions or any other kind of domestic union other than full, 
same-sex marriage violates the Massachusetts Constitution, President 
Bush's State of the Union declaration of support for a federal marriage 
amendment,24 other judicial rulings favoring and promoting same-sex un-
ions,25 and the massive outbreak of lawlessness in the issuances of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples by rogue politicians in several states,26 support 
for the Federal Marriage Amendment soared. As of October 9, 2004 there 
were 131 House member co-sponsors for H.R. Jt. Res. 56.27 
Also after the Lawrence and Goodridge decisions a Senate version of 
the Federal Marriage Amendment, Sen. Jt. Res. 26, with identical text, was 
introduced by Senator Allard (R-Colo.) on November 23,2003;28 as of Sep-
tember 22, 2004, it had ten co-sponsors.29 On March 22, 2004, an altema-
18. See generally Stanley Kurtz, Marriage News, in The Comer, http://www.nationalreview. 
comlthecorner/2002_05_12_corner-archive.asp#85090549 (May 15,2002); see also Cahill, supra 
n. 15; H.R. It. Res. 56, 108th Congo (May 21, 2003). 
19. See Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 17. The original sponsor, Ronnie Shows of Missis-
sippi, was not re-elected in 2002. According to Matt Daniels, head of the Alliance for Marriage, 
the organization that is promoting the FMA, "the delay in reintroduction was caused by my com-
mitment that we once again stick to a strategy of bi-partisan sponsorship for the FMA," and 
because House Democratic leaders have used coercive tactics to intimidate and prevent Democrats 
from co-sponsoring. E-mail from Matt Daniels, Pres., Alliance for Marriage, to Lynn Wardle 
(May 21, 2003) (copy in author's possession). 
20. H.R. It. Res. 56, Bill Summary & Status for the JOBth Cong., 108th Congo (May 21, 
2003), Lib. Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/; path Search Bills and Resolutions, select 
Summary and 108th Cong., search H.I. Res. 56, select Cosponsors [hereinafter H.R. It. Res. 56, 
Bill Status & Summary]. 
21. 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003). 
22. 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003). 
23. 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). 
24. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. D3, 162, (available at 
http://www . whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 1/20040 120-7 .htrnl). 
25. See infra nn. 273-83 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra nn. 284-88 and accompanying text. 
27. H.R. It. Res. 56, Bill Status & Summary, 108th Congo (May 21, 2003). 
28. Sen. It. Res. 26, Bill Summary & Status for the JOBth Cong., 108th Congo (Nov. 25, 
2003), Lib. Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/; path Search Bills and Resolutions, select 
Summary and 108th Cong., search S.I. Res. 26. 
29. [d. select Cosponsors. 
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tive version of the FMA, Sen. Jt. Res. 30, was introduced by Sen. Allard 
with sixteen other co-sponsors.30 A slightly modified version of it was rein-
troduced as Sen. Jt. Res. 40 on July 7, 2004 with a total of nineteen co-
sponsors.31 While identical in purpose and similar in language to the Mus-
grave FMA, the new Allard amendment provides: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a 
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution 
of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the 
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman.32 
Congress has not ignored the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. 
On May 13, 2004, hearings were held in the House of Representatives Sub-
committee on the Constitution of the Judiciary Committee on H.R. Jt. Res. 
56?3 The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, held a one-day hear-
ing on March 3, 2004, on the subject "Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: 
What Are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Goodridge Deci-
sion and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage Laws?,,34 Earlier, 
even before Sen. Jt. Res. 26 was introduced in the Senate, on September 4, 
2003, the same subcommittee held hearings on the subject of "What Is 
Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?" at 
which Professor Dale Carpenter, one of the distinguished panelists today, 
was a principal witness?5 Columnist Maggie Gallagher, one of the distin-
guished participants in this symposium, was one of the primary witnesses at 
the March 3, 2004 hearings that considered the potential need for an amend-
ment in light of the Goodridge decision legalizing same-sex marriage.36 
Three weeks later, on March 23,2004, the full Senate Judiciary Committee 
30. Sen. Jt. Res. 30, Bill Summary & Status for the J08th Cong., 108th Congo (Mar. 22, 
2004), Lib. Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/; path Search Bills and Resolutions, select 
Summary and 108th Cong., search SJ. Res. 30. 
31. Sen. Jt. Res. 40, Bill Summary & Status for the J08th Cong., 108th Congo (July 7, 2004), 
Lib. Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/; path Search Bills and Resolutions, select Summary 
and 108th Cong., search S.J. Res. 40 (accessed Mar. 13, 2005). 
32. Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 108th Congo § 2 (July 7, 2004). My thanks to Andrew Koppelman for 
sharing the identification of this Resolution. 
33. H.R. Subcomm. on the Const. of the JUd. Comm., Hearing on H.l. Res. 56, Federal 
Marriage Amendment (The Musgrave Amendment), 108th Congo (May 13, 2004) (available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/; search HJ. Res. 56) (accessed Mar. 13, 2005). 
34. Sen. Subcomm. on the Const., Civ. Rights and Prop. Rights of the Jud. Comm., Judicial 
Activism vs. Democracy: What Are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Goodridge 
Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage Laws?, 108th Congo (Mar. 3, 
2004) (available at http://judiciary.senate.govlhearing.cfm?id=l072) [hereinafter Judicial Activism 
vs. Democracy]. 
35. Sen. Subcomm. on the Const., Civ. Rights and Prop. Rights of the Jud. Comm., What Is 
Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?, 108th Congo (Sept. 4, 2003) 
(available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=906). 
36. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy, supra n. 34, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony. 
cfm?id=1072&wiUd=30n (testimony of Maggie Gallagher). 
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held hearings on Sen. Jt. Res. 26, at which a distinguished member of the 
University of St. Thomas School of Law, Professor Teresa Collett, was a 
principal witness testifying in favor of the proposed amendment.37 And 
three months later, on June 22, 2004, the whole Senate Judiciary Committee 
held yet another related hearing on "Preserving Traditional Marriage: A 
View from the States."38 Just one week after Sen. Jt. Res. 40 was intro-
duced, on July 14, 2004, it came for a record vote in the full Senate on a 
motion to invoke cloture.39 
Since very few proposed constitutional amendments reach the floor of 
either chamber, to have a vote just eight months after the proposed amend-
ment was introduced in the Senate is significant. It indicates at least three 
things: (1) that the leadership of the majority party in the Senate thinks it is 
politically important to be seen as supporting the FMA, (2) that the leader-
ship of the majority party in the Senate thinks that it will be helpful politi-
cally to have a record vote in an election year so that persons who voted for 
and against the FMA can be held accountable in the November election, 
and (3) the President, who is the national political leader of the party that 
controls the Senate, does not object to having the issue raised in a presiden-
tial election year. The Senate vote was 48 - 50 - 2 (Sens. Kerry and Ed-
wards did not vote).40 
The House also has moved ahead to consider the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment. On September 23,2004, Rep. Musgrave introduced 
H.R. Jt. Res. 106,41 a revised version of the Federal Marriage Amendment, 
with language almost identical to Sen. Allard's Sen. Jt. Res. 40.42 On Sep-
tember 30, 2004, the House voted on H.R. Jt. Res. 106 with 227 supporting 
37. Sen. Jud. Comm., A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Mar-
riage, lOSth Cong., (Mar. 23, 2004) (available at http://judiciary.senate.govlhearing.cfm?id= 
IllS). 
3S. Sen. Jud. Comm., Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View from the States, lOSth Congo 
(June 22, 2004) (available at http://judiciary.senate.govlhearing.cfm?id=1234). Massachusetts 
Governor Mitt Romney and former Representative Bob Barr were the primary witnesses. 
39. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes on the Motion to Invoke Cloture on the Motion to 
Proceed to Consider S.l. Res. 40, 10Sth Congo (July 14, 2004) (available at http://www.senate. 
govllegislativeILIS/roll_calUists/vote_menu_10S_2.htm; select 00155). 
40. Id.; see also 150 Congo Rec. SS061 (daily ed. July 14, 2004). 
41. Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a 
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to 
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other 
than the union of a man and a woman. 
H.R. Jt. Res. 106, lOSth Congo § 2 (Sept. 23, 2004). The bill had 121 co-sponsors within five 
days. H.R. Jt. Res. 106, Bill Summary & Status for the 10Bth Cong., lOSth Congo (Sept. 23, 
2004), Lib. Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/; path Search Bills and Resolutions, select 
Summary and lOSth Cong., search H.J. Res. 106 [hereinafter H.R. Jt. Res. 106 Bill Status & 
Summary]. 
42. H.J. Res. 106 uses the word "solely" while S.J. Res. 40 uses "only" to describe the legal 
exclusivity of the institution of marriage. H.R. Jt. Res. 106, lOSth Congo at § 2; Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 
lOSth Congo at § 2. 
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the proposed amendment and 186 opposing it;43 this represented over 55% 
of the vote for the amendment; but far less than the 2/3 of the vote is re-
quired for passage of a proposed amendment,44 so the proposal failed. 
B. Initial Support for and Opposition to the Federal Marriage 
Amendment 
Support for the FMA among conservative and moderate intellectual 
leaders is quite impressive, especially given the short amount of time the 
proposal has been around. The amendment was reportedly "coauthored by, 
among others, Harvard Law School Professor Mary Ann Glendon and 
Princeton political theorist Robert George."45 Among the influential lead-
ers who have publicly endorsed the FMA are former Judge Robert Bork,46 
Robert GeQrge,47 Hadley Arkes,48 Stanley Kurtz,49 Maggie Gallagher (im-
plicitly),50 and Francis Cardinal George, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Chicago.51 Numerous other well-known conservative intellectuals and 
leaders serve on the Board of Advisors of the Alliance for Marriage, the 
organization promoting the FMA.52 In late June 2003, when the United 
States Supreme Court declared laws prohibiting sodomy to be unconstitu-
tional in a very broadly-written opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,53 U.S. Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist, who had not previously supported the proposed 
43. H.R. Jt. Res. 106 Bill Status & Summary, supra n. 41. 
44. Id.; see also U.S. Const. art. v. 
45. Kurtz, supra n. 18. 
46. See Robert H. Bork, Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, Wall St. J. A14 (Aug. 7, 
2001). 
47. See Robert George, The 28th Amendment, 53 Nat!. Rev. 32 (July 23, 2001) (available at 
http://www.nationalreview.comlflashback/george200407121 021.asp). 
48. See Hadley Arkes, Gay Rights and Federalism, http://www.nationalreview.comlcom-
ment/comment-arkes080601.shtml (Aug. 6, 2001). 
49. See Stanley Kurtz, Before the Big One, http://www.nationalreview.com!kurtzlkurtz0428 
03.asp (Apr. 28, 2003); Kurtz, supra n. 18; Stanley Kurtz, Marriage's Best Chance, http://www. 
nationalreview.comlcontributorslkurtz081601.shtml (Aug. 16, 2001); Stanley Kurtz, Middle 
Ground, http://www.nationalreview.comlcomment/comment -knight08150 l.shtml (Aug. 10, 
2001); Stanley Kurtz, Point of No Return, http://www.nationalreview.comlcontributorslkurtz0803 
Ol.shtml (Aug. 3, 2001); Stanley Kurtz, The Right Balance, http://www.nationalreview.comlcon-
tributorslkurtz080101.shtml (Aug. 1, 2001); Stanley Kurtz, The Silent Treatment, http://www.na-
tionaireview.comlcontributorslkurtz071901.shtml (July 19, 2001). 
50. See Maggie Gallagher, Do We Need a Federal Marriage Amendment?, http://www.town 
hal!.comlcolurnnists/maggiegallagher/mg20010718.shtmi (July 18, 2001). 
51. See Francis Cardinal George, O.M.L, Law and Culture, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1, 16 
(Spring 2003) ("It appears increasingly to many that the best way to save marriage from privatiza-
tion and effective abolition in our culture is for pro-family forces to unite across denominational 
and racial lines to work for a federal constitutional amendment to protect marriage from judicial 
redefinition. "). 
52. Alliance for Marriage, Board of Advisors, http://www.allianceformarriage.org/sitelPage 
Server?pagename=bac_board (accessed Mar. 13, 2005) (includes Professor John Finnis, Rev. 
Richard John Neuhaus, Rabbi Yoels Schonfeld, Professor Kathryn Spaht, Professor George Dent, 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon, Professor J. Budziszeweski, and Professor Teresa Collett). 
53. 539 U.S. 558,561 (2003); see infra nn. 205-14 and accompanying text. 
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Federal Marriage Amendment, declared his support for it.54 In his State of 
the Union message in January 2004, President George W. Bush expressed 
his support for passage of a federal marriage amendment, but he did not 
recommend any particular language or endorse specifically the Federal 
Marriage Amendment then pending in Congress. 55 
The American public appears to be generally sympathetic to the idea 
of and core principle of the FMA; a national opinion survey of one thou-
sand Americans by Wirthlin Worldwide, released by the Alliance for Mar-
riage on March 4, 2003, reported that 62 percent of Americans agree that 
"marriage is the union of a man and a woman," and that 57 percent of those 
surveyed, including 63 percent of Hispanics, and 62 percent of African-
Americans, favor a constitutional amendment to protect marriage. 56 While 
many conservative organizations have expressed support for the FMA,57 the 
cultural and ideological breadth of the support of the FMA is impressive. 
Political sponsorship of the FMA has been bi-partisan and multicultural 
from the beginning. 58 When the amendment was introduced, Walter Faun-
troy, a colleague of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., organizer of the 1964 
March on Washington for Dr. King, and supporter of the FMA, declared in 
a press release: "We represent several of the largest African-American de-
nominations in the United States. We represent millions of Latinos and 
Asian-Americans. We represent Jews, Christians and Muslims from every 
ethnic background."59 Even some leading liberal politicians have expressed 
opposition to same-sex marriage (though that may not translate into support 
of the Federal Marriage Amendment).6o 
54. Stephen Dinan, Frist Backs Amendment to Define Marriage, Wash. Times (June 30, 
2003) (available at http://washingtontimes.com/nationa1l20030630-121947-443Ir.htm). 
55. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. D3, at'll 62. 
56. Alliance for Marriage, National Wirthlin Poll Finds That Most Americans Support a 
Constitutional Amendment to Defend Marriage, http://www.allianceforrnarriage.org/sitelPage 
Server?pagename=mac_030304 (Mar. 3, 2004) (26 percent disagreed, and 12 percent responded 
"don't know"). 
57. See Traditional Values Coalition, TVC Applauds Effort to Introduce 28th Amendment, 
http://www.traditionalvalues.org/article.php?sid=117 (accessed Mar. 14, 2005) (Traditional Val-
ues Coalition and their Chairman, Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, support the FMA); Texas Eagle Forum, 
Federal Defense of Marriage Amendment Generates Spirited-and Crucial-Debate, http://texas 
eagle.org/update/010806.htrnl (Aug. 6, 2001). 
58. See Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 17; Kurtz, supra n. 18. 
59. See Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 15; see also Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 52 (Note 
the religious and ethnic diversity reflected in the membership of the Alliance for Marriage Board 
of Advisors.). 
60. Georgia Log Cabin Republicans, Log Cabin Challenges Frist [R-TNJ on Anti-gay Con-
stitutional Amendment, http://www.lcrga.com/archive/200306301204.shtrnl (June 30, 2003) 
(" 'We have a tremendous amount of work to do with both Republicans and Democrats on the 
issue of respecting and recognizing our families. Former President Bill Clinton signed the De-
fense of Marriage Act with the overwhelming support of Democrats and Republicans, and even 
liberal icons like Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) 
oppose gay marriage[,'] said LCR Director of Public Affairs Mark Mead."). 
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On the other hand, early opposition to the FMA is not insignificant 
either.61 Among the opponents to the amendment are some other significant 
conservative intellectual and political leaders, including Robert Knight,62 
Professor Charles Rice,63 Jonathan Rauch,64 and Andrew Sullivan.65 Vice-
President Richard Cheney, Sen. John McCain, and Sen. Orrin Hatch also 
reportedly have expressed their opposition to or hesitancy about the FMA. 66 
Conservative organizations such as the Family Research Council, Con-
cerned Women for America, and the American Family Association also op-
pose the FMA.67 The leaders of both the American Bar Association's 
Family Law Section, Sharon Corbitt, and the predominantly black National 
Bar Association's Family Law Section, Ernie Z. Carter, expressed their op-
position to the FMA.68 Likewise, Democratic Party leaders in the U.S. 
House of Representatives reportedly have worked vigorously to prevent 
61. Politically, conservatives are split (between those giving priority to protecting marriage 
supporting the FMA and those favoring federalism opposing it) while liberals are apparently 
united (those favoring same-sex marriage opposing the FMA on that ground, and those favoring 
federalization of family law have so far been quiet or deferred to the substantive position). 
62. See Robert H. Knight, It's a Sin, http://www.nationalreview.comicommenticomment-
knight081501.shtml (Aug. 15,2001); Robert H. Knight, No Room for Compromise, http://www. 
nationalreview .comicommenticomment-knight08090 1.shtml (Aug. 9, 2001). 
63. Charles E. Rice, A Cultural Tour of the Legal Landscape: Reflections on Cardinal 
George's Law and Culture, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 81, 109-10 (2003). 
64. See Jonathan Rauch, Getting It Right, http://www.nationalreview.comicommenticom-
ment-rauch080701.shtml (Aug. 7, 2001); Jonathan Rauch, Give Federalism a Chance, http:// 
www.nationalreview.comicommenticomment-rauch08020 l.shtml (Aug. 2, 2001). 
65. See Kurtz, Point of No Return, supra n. 49 (citing Sullivan's arguments that there is no 
real threat of judicial nationalization of same-sex marriage); Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49 
(suggesting Sullivan opposes the FMA). While neither prominent nor influential, the author also 
expressed his reticence to support the FMA. See Wardle, supra n. 14. 
66. Cheney, in the 2000 vice-presidential debate, said, "I think different states are likely to 
come to different conclusions, and that's appropriate. I don't think there should necessarily be a 
federal policy in this area." Equal Families, National Leaders Say "No" to the Federal Marriage 
Amendment'll 2, http://www.equalfamilies.cominational_leaders.htm (accessed Feb. 18, 2005). 
Sen. Hatch is quoted as writing in a letter to a constituent on January 2, 2003: "[TJhe definition of 
marriage, as with virtually all family law issues, traditionally falls under the prerogative of the 
States under the historic norm of federalism. This proposed constitutional amendment turns this 
understanding on its head by federalizing the marriage definition." Id. at 'lI 4. However, at a 
hearing about the need for a constitutional amendment, Sen. Hatch explicitly stated that he fully 
supports the FMA, although he also added that "other approaches may be necessary." On July 13, 
2004, Senator McCain issued a statement regarding the FMA in which he stated that constitutional 
amendments concerning the definition of marriage are best left to state constitutions and that a 
federal constitutional amendment would usurp "from the states a fundamental authority they have 
always possessed, and imposes a federal remedy for a problem that most states do not believe 
confronts them, and which they feel capable of resolving should it confront them, again according 
to local standards and customs." John McCain, Statement on the Federal Marriage Amendment'll 
5, http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=NewsCenter.ViewPressRelease&ContenUd= 
1296 (July 13, 2004). 
67. See MassNews, Why Is Dr. Dobson Splitting Conservatives on Federal Marriage Amend-
ment 'lI 1, http://www.massnews.comi2003 _Editions/LJ an/O 11403_mn_dobson_split30nservs. 
shtml (accessed Nov. 23, 2004). 
68. Cahill, supra n. 15. 
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Democrats serving in Congress from supporting the FMA.69 Obviously, 
most liberal and gay organizations oppose the Federal Marriage 
Amendment.7o 
C. What the Federal Marriage Amendment Would Do and Would Not 
Do 
The Federal Marriage Amendment would have at least six significant 
legal effects. First, sentence one establishes a substantive definition of mar-
riage by providing that only male-female unions shall constitute marriage in 
the United States. The word "only" is a key term because it clearly limits 
marriage in America to "the union of a man and a woman" and clearly 
excludes all same-gender unions. The drafters' choice of "[m]arriage ... 
shall consist of' is meant to define marriage for both regulation and recog-
nition purposes-to bar inter jurisdictional recognition of foreign same-sex 
marriages in the United States,71 as well as to prohibit the contracting of 
same-sex marriage in any State of the Union.72 It is meant to establish as 
clearly and solidly as possible, in constitutional concrete, a national, uni-
form definition of one dimension of marriage providing that only male-
female unions are marriages in America. 
Second, sentence one of the FMA defines one element of marriage as a 
matter of federal constitutional text. This "federalizes" at least part of the 
legal definition-and perhaps more broadly the general regulation-of mar-
riage. Historically, it has been said that the direct definition and regulation 
of marriage has been a matter reserved to the "virtually exclusive province 
69. E-mail, supra n. 19. 
70. See e.g. ACLU, Marriage Amendment: Oppose Writing Intolerance Into the U.S. Consti-
tution, http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGay Rights.cfm ?ID=9977 &c= I 0 I (ac-
cessed Feb. 18,2005); Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, HRC Condemns Planned Anti-
Gay Constitutional Amendment (July 12, 2001); Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and 
Gays of Fort Wayne, Anti-Gay Constitutional Amendment Proposed '118, http://members.aol.com/ 
pfiagfw/archiveslz0207.htm (accessed Feb. 18, 2005); Ontario Consultants on Religious Toler-
ance, Proposed Marriage Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Introduction to the Bill as Origi-
nally Worded in 2002, http://www.religioustolerance.org/mar_amend1.htm (accessed Mar. 13, 
2005). "David Buckel, senior staff attorney and coordinator of the [Lambda Legal Defense 
Fund's] Legal Marriage Project, comments: ... 'To take the extraordinary step of amending the 
Constitution to prohibit states from giving gay couples and their children the legal protections they 
need and deserve is an affront to justice.' Lambda feels that: 'many families can be strengthened 
by the rights and responsibilities that civil marriage provides.''' Id. at '119; Log Cabin Republicans 
of Georgia, Unprecedented Constitutional Amendment on Federal Marriage Proposed by Anti-
gay Coalition, http://www.lcrga.com/archive/200107161606.shtrnl (July 16, 2001); see also 
Lambda Legal, Marriage Project, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-binliowa/issues/record?record 
=9 (accessed Apr. 26, 2005). 
71. George, supra n. 47, at 34; Alliance for Marriage, The Federal Marriage Amendment: 
Responses to Common Questions, http://www.allianceforrnarriage.org/site/PageServer?pagename 
=macjaq (accessed Mar. 13, 2005). 
72. George, supra n. 47, at 34; Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71. 
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of the states,'m but federal law indirectly influences the definition of mar-
riage. For example, Congress can and does define what it means by "mar-
riage" when that term is used in federal laws-such as in income tax laws, 
social security laws, welfare benefits, military survivor laws, immigration 
laws, etc.-but even for federal law purposes Congress generally just incor-
porates the definition of marriage used in the relevant state.74 However, 
sometimes Congress or federal agencies specifically define the term "mar-
riage" for purpose of a particular federal program, statute, or rule in a par-
ticular way that is not entirely consistent with state definitions of marriage. 
For example, marriages between u.s. citizens and foreigners are not con-
sidered for purposes of family preference in immigration law unless the 
parties have complied with federal requirements in addition to state laws.75 
Likewise, for tax purposes, end-of-year marriage dissolutions followed by 
immediate remarriage are not considered as valid divorces?6 In those in-
73. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404; see generally Lynn D. Wardle, Institutionalizing Marriage Re-
forms through Federalism, in Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-First Century 
167-75 (Alan J. Hawkins, Lynn D. Wardle & David Orgon Coolidge eds., Praeger 2002). 
74. See e.g. U.S. v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1966) (federal courts do not override state 
family law but borrow unless clear congressional order); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306,309 
(1964) ("[I]n applying the federal standard we shall be guided by state law insofar as the property 
interests of the widow created by state law are concerned."); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 
580-81 (1956) (especially in family law, federal courts "draw on the ready-made body of state law 
to define [words such as] children."); Sullivan v. Commr., 256 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1958) (holding 
that issue of marital status for purposes of right to file a joint tax return must be determined 
according to the law of the state in which the decree was issued); Boyter v. Commr., 74 T.C. 989, 
1001 (1980) (holding that Maryland law controlled marital status of husband and wife who en-
tered into a year-end divorce for tax purposes and that since Maryland law refused to recognize 
the divorce, it would not be recognized for federal tax purposes); see also Daniel J. Lathrope, 
State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 
257, 260-61 (1983) (noting that federal tax law generally "defers to local law determinations of 
marital status, recognizing the substantial interests and expertise of the states in domestic relations 
matters" and that "if taxpayers are considered married under state law, they will be considered 
married for federal income tax purposes"); see generally Wardle, supra n. 73. 
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2000) (for purposes of immigration law, the terms "spouse," 
"wife," or "husband" do not apply to unconsummated marriages performed where the parties were 
not in each other's physical presence at the time of the ceremony); 8 U.S.c. § 1325(c) (2000) 
("Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision 
of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined not more than 
$250,000, or both."); 8 U.S.c. § 1186(a) (2000) (conditional permanent resident status for certain 
spouses; improper marriages [even if valid by state law]); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (2000) (two year 
residence outside of United States required before entitled to preference or immediate relative 
status for immigration); see also Lutwak v. U.S., 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (conviction for INS mar-
riage fraud, even though marriages apparently valid under foreign law); Aguila-Cisneros v. l.N.S., 
5 Fed. Appx. 415 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (upholding two-year delay after marriage rule); 
U.S. v. Chowdhury, 169 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for marriage fraud for 
immigration purposes); Manwani v. I.N.S., 736 F.Supp. 1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (§ 1154 two-year 
delay violates Fifth Amendment). 
76. See 26 U.S.C. § 21(e) (stating that individuals will not be considered married under cer-
tain circumstances for purposes of the child care tax credit); Boyter, 74 T.C. at 994 ("It has 
consistently been held that for Federal income tax purposes, the determination of the marital status 
of the parties must be made in accordance with the law of the State of their domicile.") (citations 
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stances, Congress is not directly regulating domestic relations-marriage-
but is only controlling federal laws and programs such as immigration, tax, 
welfare, etc. Thus, it is possible that a couple may be legally married 
under, and for all purposes of, state law, but still not be deemed married for 
purposes of federal immigration or tax law, etc.77 The proposed FMA 
would change this by making the dual-gender element of the definition of 
marriage a matter of federal law. 
Third, sentence one of the. proposed FMA also constitutionalizes at 
least part of the definition of marriage. That would constitute a major 
change in constitutional law because no other provision of the Constitution 
speaks directly to an issue of family law, and the Supreme Court has only 
infrequently decided cases concerning constitutional dimensions of the right 
to marry.78 Under sentence one, the definition of marriage as only a male-
female union would assume very clear and explicit "constitutional civil 
right" status, like other specific constitutional guarantees (speech, press, re-
ligion, etc.). 
Fourth, sentence two of the original FMA clearly prohibited all judges 
and any other legal interpreters, possibly agency officials, for instance, from 
"constru[ing]" any of four different sources of law: (1) the U.S. Constitu-
tion, (2) any state constitution, (3) federal law, and (4) state law-"to re-
quire" either of two legal effects-"that (1) marital status or (2) the legal 
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groupS."79 Sen. Jt. 
Res. 40, the latest revision of the FMA by Sen. Allard, which the full Sen-
ate considered and voted on, deletes reference to nonconstitutional federal 
law and state law, so it prohibits construing only two sources of law, federal 
or state constitutional law, to require the two effects mentioned.80 Thus, 
sentence two is primarily addressed to judges-who do most of the "con-
stru[ing]" of federal and state constitutional provisions and laws.81 It pro-
omitted); see also 26 U.S.C. § 121(d)(6) (superseded 1997) (defining "marital status" for purposes 
of an income tax provision). 
77. See e.g. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aft d, 673 F.2d 1036 
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding that state law generally applies for purposes of determining marital status 
in immigration law unless the state law offends the policy of the federal legislation); U.S. v. 
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 
78. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 
1790-1990, 41 How. LJ. 289 (1998) (noting that the Court has addressed marriage issues in 
dozens of cases in the two centuries from 1790-1990, but only decided constitutional marriage 
issues four times, beginning with Loving). 
79. H.R. It. Res. 56, 108th Congo at § 1. 
80. See Sen. It. Res. 40, 108th Congo 
81. Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71 ("[T]he weakening of the legal status of marriage in 
America at the hands of the courts has already begun. This process represents nothing less than a 
profound social revolution-advancing apart from the democratic process and against the will of 
the American people."); Rice, supra n. 63, at 108-109 (quoting Robert Bork) ("The second sen-
tence expresses the main thrust of the amendment. It recognizes that liberal activist courts are the 
real problem."); Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49 ("The major gay rights organizations have 
vowed to litigate everything-DOMA, civil unions, recently passed marriage amendments. We 
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hibits a particular line of interpretation or construction by judges that would 
extend marital status or marital benefits to nonmarital couples or groups. It 
applies to all judges and officials of all levels of government in the United 
States-of the federal, state, and local governments. The primary effect of 
this is to prevent federal judges from ordering the creation or extension of 
quasi-marital status-such as same-sex domestic partnership or civil un-
ions-or marital benefits-such as preference in custody and adoption, 
marital testimonial privilege, property interests, claims for support, etc.-to 
heterosexual or same-sex coupleS.82 If enacted, the Federal Marriage 
Amendment would be an additional separation of powers provision; rein-
forcing the line between the judicial branch and the legislative branch, and 
between the judicial process and the constitution amending processes. 
Fifth, the Federal Marriage Amendment clearly preserves the authority 
of legislatures, state and federal, to enact laws providing "that (1) marital 
status or (2) the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried 
couples or groupS."83 Thus, it does not prohibit the creation of another 
legal status equivalent to marriage-called, perhaps, "Civil Unions" or 
"Domestic Partnerships" or "Reciprocal Beneficiaries" -nor does it pro-
hibit the extension of the same benefits given married couples to such alter-
native quasi-marital unions, or the extension of any particular marital 
benefits and "incidents" to any heterosexual or same-sex nonmarital 
couples-so long as it is done by the legislature. 
Sixth, the Federal Marriage Amendment is intended to "ha[ ve] no im-
pact at all on benefits offered by private businesses and corporations."84 It 
"would not prevent businesses from offering employment benefits to 
should take them at their word. They will throw in the constitutional kitchen sink. To the extent 
possible, they will select federal or state courts that are sympathetic to their cause, and it only 
takes one or two courts to throw everything up in the air.") (quoting David Coolidge); see also 
infra nn. 96-102 and accompanying text. 
82. See George, supra n. 47, at 34 ("If state and federal judges remain free to manufacture 
marriage law as they please, the prestige of liberal sexual ideology in the law schools and other 
elite sectors of our society will eventually overwhelm conventional democratic defenses. The only 
sure means of preserving the institution of marriage .for future generations of Americans is a 
federal constitutional amendment protecting marriage as the union of a man and a woman."); 
Alliance for Marriage, Legal Impact of the Federal Marriage Amendment, http://www.alliancefor 
marriage.org/reports/fma/colorchart.cfm (accessed May 19,2003) (The FMA would prohibit judi-
cial redefinition of marriage, legalization of domestic partnership or civil unions, [or] extension of 
marriage benefits to unmarried partners.). 
83. See Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 82 ("The FMA ... would not prevent businesses 
from offering employment benefits to nonmarital partners. It would bar state legislatures from 
redefining marriage, but would not prevent state legislatures from legalizing domestic partnership 
or civil unions, extending marriage benefits to unmarried partners, or stop businesses from offer-
ing employment benefits to nonmarital partners."); Rice, supra n. 63, at 109 ("This Amendment 
would write into the Constitution an implicit guarantee that a state legislature could give all the 
incidents of marriage to a union between a man and woman, two men, two women, a man and a 
dog, or whatever, as long as they do not call it 'marriage.' "); see also George, supra n. 47; Bork, 
supra n. 46; Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49. 
84. See Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 17. See also Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 82. 
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nonmarital partners. It . . . would not ... stop businesses from offering 
employment benefits to nonmarital partners.,,85 
D. Rationales for and Defenses of the Federal Marriage Amendment 
To date, ten discrete rationales for and defenses (responses to criti-
cisms) of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment have been offered. 
First are very deep concerns about the threat to the integrity of the institu-
tion of marriage posed by proposals to legalize same-sex marriage. As 
Robert George has written: "Everybody knows that marriage is in 
trouble. . . . Still, there is something unique in the threat posed by the 
movement for 'same-sex marriage."'86 Same-sex marriage poses a critical 
threat to marriage because of the tremendous transformative effect legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage would have upon the institution of marriage and 
upon society. 
At the core of the traditional understanding of marriage in our 
society is a principled commitment to monogamy and fidelity. 
Marriage, as embodied in our customs, laws, and public policies, 
is intelligible and defensible as a one-flesh union whose character 
and value give a man and a woman moral reasons (going beyond 
mere subjective preferences or sentimental motivations) to pledge 
sexual exclusivity, fidelity, and permanence of commitment. ... 
[Legalizing same-sex marriage] will deny that there are such 
moral reasons. Any such argument would have to treat marriage 
as a purely private matter designed solely to satisfy the desires of 
the 'married' parties.87 
They fear that legalizing same-sex marriage, unlike changing the age 
of marriage or degrees of consanguinity forbidden or liberalizing grounds 
for divorce, "would in effect abolish the institution, by collapsing the moral 
principles at its foundation."88 Thus, supporters of the Federal Marriage 
Amendment believe that "[t]he only sure means of preserving the institution 
of marriage for future generations of Americans is a federal constitutional 
amendment protecting marriage as the union of a man and a woman."89 
Second, some supporters of the proposed Federal Marriage Amend-
ment argue that the Founders of the Constitution assumed that only male-
female couples could marry, and that assumption about pre-political rela-
tions was part of the foundation upon which the Constitution was built. 
85. /d.; see also George, supra n. 47, at 34. 
86. George, supra n. 47, at 32; Kathryn Jean Lopez, Looking for Love in All the Wrong Ways 
'll 11, http://www.nationalreview.com/nccommentinccomment073001a.shtml (July 30, 2001) 
("It's definitely time for Americans, in some public way, to embrace marriage, rather than down-
play it and devalue it. (Think what you will of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, it is a 
clear statement in support of a hurting institution, on the verge of endangerment.)"). 
87. George, supra n. 47, at 32. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 34. 
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Thus, Stanley Kurtz has argued that: "[T]he Founders did indeed presup-
pose heterosexual marriage, and our country's unity depends upon holding 
fast to a single basic definition of marriage. That is why the Federal Mar-
riage Amendment's definition of marriage makes sense."90 He asserts that 
the Founders simply took male-female marriage for granted as the social 
foundation for the Constitution.91 Robert George agrees. He asserts: 
At the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted, it was taken for 
granted that marriage is the union of a man and a woman ordered 
to the rearing of children in circumstances conducive to moral 
uprightness .... There was no need at the time for marriage to be 
expressly defined or protected by federal law or the Constitution. 
Consequently, the word "marriage" does not appear in the Consti-
tution (nor, for that matter does the word "family"). Our forefa-
thers shared the consensus of humanity, which viewed marriage 
as a union between sexually complementary persons-that is, 
persons of opposite sexes.92 
As the Alliance for Marriage puts it: "The institution of marriage is so 
central to the well being of both children and our society that it was, until 
recently, difficult to imagine that marriage itself would need explicit consti-
tutional protection .... [O]ur country's time-honored understanding [is] that 
marriage is-in its very essence-the union of male and female .... "93 
Thus, supporters of the FMA see a critical need to constitutionalize the core 
foundation of constitutional society. As Matt Daniels, head of the Alliance 
for Marriage says: "We have to have some sort of common currency."94 
Professor Hadley Arkes argues: "[W]e are seeking to establish, in the fun-
damentallaw, the essential meaning of marriage as the union only of a man 
and a woman. ,,95 
Third, the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment reflects very deep 
concerns about, and a very strong desire to restrict, judicial activism in the 
form of judicial redefinition of marriage or judicial recognition of same-sex 
marriage or same-sex domestic partnership from other jurisdictions. For 
example, Robert George succinctiy argues: 
It is noteworthy that proponents of same-sex marriage have 
sought to change public policy through judicial decree. Where 
they have won, they have won through the courts. Where the 
issue has been settled in the court of public opinion, they have 
lost. The lesson is clear: If the institution of marriage is to be 
90. Kurtz, Middle Ground, supra n. 49. 
91. Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49. 
92. George, supra n. 47, at 32. 
93. See Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71. 
94. Cahill, supra n. 15. 
95. Hadley Arkes, Sleight of Hand'll 5, http://www.nationalreview.com/commenticomment-
arkesprint081401.htrnl (Aug. 14, 2001). 
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preserved, a campaign to settle the issue democratically at the na-
tionallevel must be mounted--..:.and quicldy.96 
Likewise, Robert Bork has asserted: 
[Gay] activists have concentrated their efforts on courts, knowing 
that judges have pushed, and continue to push, the culture to the 
left. . . . Many court watchers believe that within five to 10 years 
the U.S. Supreme Court will hold that there is a constitutional 
right to homosexual marriage, just as that court invented a right to 
abortion.97 
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As Stanley Kurtz puts it: "[T]here is already a national culture war 
over the issue of gay marriage. The Federal Marriage Amendment did not 
start this war. Judicial arrogance in Vermont did that."98 David Coolidge, 
Director of the Marriage Law Project at the Catholic University of 
America's Columbus Law School warned: 
The major gay rights organizations have vowed to litigate every-
thing-DOMA, civil unions, recently passed marriage amend-
ments. We should take them at their word. They will throw in the 
constitutional kitchen sink. To the extent possible, they will select 
federal or state courts that are sympathetic to their cause, and it 
only takes one or two courts to throw everything up in the air.99 
Professor Hadley Arkes argues that "Many . . . judges have shown a 
breathtaking willingness to assume for themselves the power to remodel the 
very matrix of our laws on the beginning and ending of life, on marriage 
and the family and the meaning of sexuality itself,"loo and that gay activists 
are asking federal courts to impose a national rule regarding same-sex mar-
riage. If courts do that it would "amount to a federal revision of the laws on 
marriage-as surely as any change brought about in a constitutional amend-
ment."101 Because of rampant judicial activism, judges have imposed their 
personal policy preferences in the guise of interpreting the Constitution, and 
some have shown a willingness to force states to legalize same-sex mar-
riage or an equivalent domestic partnership or civil union status. 102 
Fourth, some supporters of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment 
see the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the vehicle through which courts 
96. George, supra n. 47, at 32. 
97. Bork, supra n. 46; see also George, supra n. 47, at 34 (noting Evan Wolfson's prediction 
of same-sex marriage within five years). 
98. Kurtz, Point of No Return, supra n. 49. See also Stanley Kurtz, Oh, Canada! 'j[ 14, http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/scri ptiprintpage.asp?ref=/Kurtzlkurtz061303 .asp (June 13, 2003) 
("American judges are usurping the role of legislators and imposing their views on the public."). 
99. Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49, at'll 5. 
100. Arkes, supra n. 48, at'll 7. 
101. Id. at 'll 1. 
102. Id. at 34 ("If state and federal judges remain free to manufacture marriage law as they 
please, the prestige of liberal sexual ideology in the law schools and other elite sectors of our 
society will eventually overwhelm conventional democratic defenses."). 
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will nationally legalize same-sex marriage. 103 As shown in Hawaii, Alaska, 
Vermont, and Massachusetts, "[t]he strategy [has been] to get some state 
supreme court to recognize same-sex marriage. Other states would then be 
compelled to recognize these 'marriages,' because of the constitutional re-
quirement that states extend 'Full Faith and Credit' to one another's 'public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings.' "104 The fact that 85 percent of all 
civil unions that have been registered in Vermont involve out-of-state par-
ties, and that nearly 90 percent of all new civil union registrations involve 
out-of-state gay or lesbian couples, underscores the potential risk of export-
ing same-sex marriage or civil unions from a single state to all other 
states. !Os It is asserted that a patchwork approach to interjurisdictional va-
lidity of same-sex unions will never be tolerated by the courtS.106 As Stan-
ley Kurtz put it: 
There is every reason to fear that a legal mandate for gay mar-
riage in but a single state will quickly result in the imposition of 
gay marriage on the nation as a whole. A federal amendment de-
fining marriage as a union of a man and a woman is the only way 
to prevent this. 107 
Fifth, there is concern that, because of the vigorous challenges, the 
federal and various state DOMAs will be invalidated by some state or fed-
eral judges and the Full Faith and Credit Clause interpreted to force states to 
103. Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71, at 'J[11. "First, the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) cannot prevent state courts from subverting democracy and undermining marriage at the 
state level in states such as Vermont and Massachusetts. Second, there are very good reasons to 
believe that both state marriage laws and the federal Defense of Marriage Act will not survive if 
challenged in court." [d. at 'J['J[9-1O. The Full Faith and Credit Clause "has the potential to over-
ride DOMA and force states that don't recognize gay marriage to accept marriages celebrated in 
states that do." Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49, at 'J[ 6. 
104. George, supra n. 47, at'J[ 9. 
105. As of April 18, 2003, 5,461 civil unions had been registered in Vermont: 825 (15%) 
involved Vermont residents; 4,636 (85%) involved nonresidents. Marriage Watch, Media Re-
sources, Civil Union Statistics, www.marriagewatch.org/media/cudata.htm (accessed Dec. 14, 
2004) (citing Vt. Dept. of Health, Vital Records Unit). According to the Vermont Civil Union 
Review Commission, "[t]he proportion of civil unions involving Vermont residents continues to 
decrease .... [Clurrently [in 2002], 11% of people entering civil unions are Vermonters. Re-
sidents from 48 states, the District of Columbia, Canada and several other countries have estab-
lished civil unions in Vermont." Office of Legislative Council, Report of the Vermont Civil Union 
Review Commission Finding 3, 'J[3 (Jan. 2002) (available at http://www.leg.state.vt.uslbakerlFinal 
%20CURC%20Report%20for%202002.htm). 
106. Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49, at 'J['J[ 1, 16 ("[A] patchwork solution-gay mar-
riage legalized in some states but forbidden in others-is next to impossible .... [A] state-by-
state patchwork of radically distinct marriage practices is unprecedented, untenable, and pro-
foundly anti-federalist."); Arkes, supra n. 95 ("It is illusory to think that the gay activists would 
settle for that arrangement,[ a checkerboard policy in which gay marriages were not recognized in 
some states]."); Kurtz, Oh, Canada!, supra n. 98, at 'J[1O ("[A] patchwork solution for marriage 
laws will be impossible to sustain."). 
107. Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49, at 'J[3. See also Kurtz, Oh, Canada!, supra n. 98. 
"Passage of the Federal Marriage Amendment ... is the only way to take marriage out of the 
hands of the courts and put it back into the hands of the people." [d. at 'J[15. 
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recognize same-sex marriages or civil unions from other states. lOS For ex-
ample, Judge Bork complains: 
Activists are already trying to nationalize same-sex unions: Same-
sex couples will travel to any state that allows them to marry or 
have civil unions, relying on the constitutional requirement that 
states give full faith and credit to the judgments of other states to 
validate their status in their home states. They will attack the 
constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act [DOMA], 
which seeks to block this. 109 
Professor George agrees: 
[Gay] activists are putting forward a number of theories to per-
suade judges to declare the Defense of Marriage Act, and the state 
acts, unconstitutional. They may well succeed. [Just as the Colo-
rado Constitutional amendment forbidding 'gay rights' laws was 
declared in Romer to be based on unconstitutional "animus" to-
ward homosexuals,] "[t]he Defense of Marriage Act could surely 
be characterized the same way by socially liberal federal 
judges. llo 
Moreover, the section of the Federal DOMA that allows states to de-
cline to recognize same-sex marriage might be invalidated by a court jeal-
ous of having the "final word" on interpretation of the Constitution. III 
Thus, we are urged to follow the example of the drafters of the Civil War 
Amendments who passed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
108. Kurtz, Before the Big One, supra n. 49, at'J[ 5 ("Once Massachusetts legalizes gay mar-
riage, it will be a domestic culture-war story like no other. Gay couples will flood into Massachu-
setts from around the country to get married. Returning to their homes, these gay couples will 
initiate a series of lawsuits attempting to force recognition of their marriages onto their respecti ve 
states. The suits will rest on constitutional grounds of equal protection, full faith and credit - and 
any other grounds the plaintiffs can think of. There will also be legal challenges to the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act. The airwaves will be filled with sympathetic stories about married gay 
couples who can't get their unions recognized in their own homes."); Arkes, supra n. 48, at'J[ 2 
(arguing that if a state refuses to recognize a sister-state gay marriage under a DOMA, federal 
judges will disregard federalism and strike down federal or state DOMAs). 
109. Robert Bork, Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, Wall St. J. A14 (Aug. 7, 2001). 
110. George, supra n. 47, at'J[ 15; accord Arkes, supra n. 48, at 'J['J[ 1-2; Alliance for Marriage, 
supra n. 71, at 'J['J[ 10-11. 
Id. 
111. Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71, at 'J[ 11. 
Indeed, although the federal courts may uphold the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
insofar as it applies to federal law, they will almost certainly invalidate the section of the 
act that purports to bar interstate transmission of same-sex "marriage." This is because 
the section of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act that applies to the states will be 
treated as an effort by Congress to offer an authoritative interpretation of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause as applied to same-sex marriages. But the modem Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that acts of Congress which are premised upon a purportedly authorita-
tive interpretation of a constitutional text will be invalidated. This is because, under the 
established doctrine of Judicial Supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation, 
only the Court can offer an authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. For example, 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was struck down by the Supreme Court on the 
grounds that it purported to offer an authoritative interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
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ments to take slavery issues out of the hands of judges who had given the 
country Dred Scott v. Sandford,112 and to even remove the issue from the 
reach of legislative majorities and politicians. 113 
Sixth, concern that judicial activists will impose same-sex marriage by 
judicial fiat is a major motivation. Federal Marriage Amendment support-
ers are wary of state court judicial activists-especially in states with re-
strictive, anti-populist constitutional amendment procedures, like 
Massachusetts and Vermont-interpreting state constitutional provisions so 
as to judicially impose same-sex marriage or its equivalent. Some support-
ers of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment see the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause as the likely 
vehicle for judicial rulings compelling the legalization of same-sex mar-
riagey4 Stanley Kurtz presciently predicted a year before it occurred: "In 
just a few months, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is likely to 
legalize gay marriage [in Goodridge v. Dept. of Health], thus setting off a 
titanic national struggle."115 That has led to efforts to export same-sex mar-
riage to all other states. When the Ontario Court of Appeals ordered the 
government to immediately issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, in 
June 2003, gay and lesbian couples from the United States began going to 
Ontario to become "legally married" there; within two weeks of the deci-
sion same-sex couples from a dozen states, as far away as California, had 
traveled to Toronto to be marriedY6 It has been conservatively estimated 
that of the 6,000 foreign same-sex couples to marry in Canada-40 percent 
of the 14,000 total same-sex marriages there-over 1,000 were American 
gay and lesbian couples.1l7 The same phenomenon will occur when the first 
112. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
113. See Arkes, supra n. 48, at 'I[ 6. 
114. Bork, supra n. 46; see also Robert H. Bork, The Judge's Role in Law and Culture, 1 Ave 
Maria L. Rev. 19,23 (Spring 2003) ("The argument for a federal right to same-sex marriage will 
probably rely upon the Equal Protection Clause and will analogize the status of homosexuals to 
that of blacks prior to Brown v. Board of Education or, more pertinently, to Loving v. Virginia."). 
The June 26, 2003, decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas increases these 
concerns. 539 U.S. 558; see infra nn. 203-15, 304 and accompanying text. 
115. Kurtz, Before the Big One, supra n. 49, at 'I[ 5, see also Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 
69. 
116. Clifford Krauss, A Few Gay Americans Tie the Knot in Canada, N.Y. Times A2 (June 
28, 2003). "Gay and lesbian couples, some from as far away as California and Britain, are coming 
to Toronto to marry." Id. "So far, same-sex couples from 12 states have obtained marriage li-
censes in Toronto since it became legal for them to do so June 10. A handful of other American 
gay and lesbian couples have secured licenses in Ottawa and Windsor." Id. at 'I[ 9. 
117. Alan Bayless, Chicago Gay Couple Ties the Knot in Canada, Chi. Sun-Times 4 (Jan. 14, 
2004) (383 American couples married in BC; numbers not available for Ontario); Canadian Press 
Newswire & Steven Fairbairn, American Same-Sex Couples Exchange Wedding Vows in Toronto 
'I[ 25 (Feb. 14,2004) (available at LEXIS, ALLNWS library, CURNWS) (14,700 gays and lesbi-
ans married in Toronto from July 2003 through year's end, of whom 6,800 were non-Canadians); 
Sarall Robertson, Journeys; Mining the Gold in Gay Nuptials, N.Y. Times F1 (Dec. 19, 2003) 
("The number of couples from the United States who have gone to Canada to get married is still 
relatively small-356 in Toronto (through Dec. 16) and 729 in British Columbia (through the end 
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American state without an anti-evasive marriage provision legalizes same-
sex marriages (as occurred in Vermont with out-of-state couples registering 
civil unions there)Ys Litigation over recognition of those same-sex mar-
riages in other American states is inevitable. 119 
Seventh, supporters also see the proposed Federal Marriage Amend-
ment as necessary to preserve popular sovereignty and democratic self-gov-
ernment in matters of marriage regulation from judicial "platonic 
guardians."12o A constitutional amendment is deemed necessary to save 
democratic processes from judicial elitists who will impose their own pri-
vate preference for gay marriage upon the people by anti-democratic judi-
cial interpretation. "[T]he weakening of the legal status of marriage in 
America at the hands of the courts has already begun. This process repre-
sents nothing less than a profound social revolution-advancing apart from 
the democratic process and against the will of the American people."121 As 
Robert George put it: 
If state and federal judges remain free to manufacture marriage 
law as they please, the prestige of liberal sexual ideology in the 
law schools and other elite sectors of our society will eventually 
overwhelm conventional democratic defenses. The only sure 
means of preserving the institution of marriage for future genera-
tions of Americans is a federal constitutional amendment protect-
ing marriage as the union of a man and a woman. 122 
Robert Bork agrees. "If courts are prevented from ordering same-sex 
marriage or its equivalent, the question of arrangements less than marriage 
of November), according to government records."); Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells Heard 
Around the World: Years from Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried about Same-Sex Mar-
riage? 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 589, 593 (2004) ("Same-sex couples in Canada took immediate 
advantage of this right to marry, as did hundreds of same-sex couples from the United States and 
other countries that have not yet recognized same-sex marriage."); see also E. J. Graff, Marriage 
License 'J[ 3, http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2003/06/graff-e-06-23.html (June 23, 2003) 
("[F]rom Seattle to Vancouver, Minneapolis to Winnipeg, Detroit to Windsor, Buffalo to Toronto 
or pretty much anywhere from New England to Montreal, American same-sex pairs can now take 
legal vows-in English, no less-with just a quick trip across the border. ... American lesbian 
and gay couples are already zipping over and back; by year's end, the new underground marriage 
railroad will have carried hundreds, if not thousands."); Action Wisconsin, Thinking of Getting 
Married'J[ 1, http://www.actionwisconsin.org/civilrnarriage/gettingmarried.htrnl (last updated Dec. 
4, 2003) ("Since June, hundreds of couples have wed in Canada, including American couples."). 
118. See supra n. 105 and accompanying text. 
119. Within two years after Civil Unions were legalized in Vermont, litigation over recogni-
tion of Vermont Civil Unions had reached appellate courts in at least three states. See Lynn D. 
Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 
11 Widener J. Pub. L. 401, 421-25 (2002). 
120. Leamed Hand, The Bill of Rights 73 (Harvard U. Press 1958). "For myself it would be 
most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, 
which I assuredly do not." [d. 
121. Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71, at'J[ 2. 
122. George, supra n. 47, at'J[ 25. "If the institution of marriage is to be preserved, a cam-
paign to settle the issue democratically at the national level must be mounted-and quickly." [d. at 
'J[ 6. 
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is left where it should be, to the determination of the people through the 
democratic process."123 Stanley Kurtz writes: 
The Federal Marriage Amendment not only guards against the na-
tionalization of gay marriage by judicial fiat, it also guards 
against a state judiciary that has cast all democratic restraint to the 
wind and has taken the right to define and regulate marriage out 
of the hands of the people. Having broken faith with the princi-
ples of democracy, the nation's judiciary has left the public with 
little recourse. The decision in Vermont is exhibit A of that 
problem. 124 
Eighth, some supporters of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment 
assert that the doctrine of federalism in family law, for all practical pur-
poses, already is dead or nearly dead due to judicial activism, and that the 
FMA is the last, best way to preserve the core principle. Judge Bork ar-
gues: "One way or another, federalism is going to be overridden."125 More-
over, federalism arguments against the FMA are irrelevant because "[a] 
constitutional ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of same-sex marriage 
would itself override federalism."126 The FMA is necessary to preserve the 
core principle of federalism before it is entirely destroyed by judicial activ-
ism, and family federalism purists who quibble against the FMA will cause 
another lost opportunity if they do not support the FMA. 127 
Supporters of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment insist that 
the amendment preserves the core principle of federalism in family law.128 
They argue that "federalism is actually a careful balancing of national unity 
with state diversity. [F]ederalism has always demanded national common-
ality in the fundamental definition of marriage."129 They view the FMA as 
a "middle road" approach to federalism, confirming the critical definition of 
marriage as male-female, but the "detailing of benefits" is left to the state 
legislatures, who retain the latitude to decide whether to create same-sex 
civil unions, or to extend benefits to gay and other nonmarital couples.130 
Ninth, some advocates of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment 
also reject what they call "false federalism, that begins from the premise 
that we leave the decision to the states because there is no truth to declare, 
123. Bark, supra n. 46, at'll 9. 
124. Kurtz, Point of No Return, supra n. 49, at'll'll17-18. 
125. Bork, supra n. 46, at'll 12. 
126. Bork, supra n. 46, at'll 11. 
127. See Kurtz, Middle Ground, supra n. 49; Bork, supra n. 46. 
128. George, supra n. 47, at'll 24. 
129. Kurtz, Point of No Return, supra n. 49, at'll 14. 
130. See Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49; Alliance for Marriage, supra n. 71, at'll 16 
("[T]he amendment does not depart from principles of federalism under which family law is, for 
the most part, a state matter. The traditional autonomy of state legislatures on family law matters 
is preserved."). 
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no sense of right and wrong that finally commands our judgment."l3l They 
argue that: "[A] state-by-state patchwork of radically distinct marriage prac-
tices is unprecedented, untenable, and profoundly anti-federalist."132 The 
purpose of constitutional amendments is to establish basic truths in consti-
tutional concrete, "to secure something of substance, beyond the shifts and 
vagaries of local politics."l33 
Tenth, supporters of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment de-
fend the failure to preclude state legislation legalizing same-sex domestic 
partnerships, civil unions, or marital benefits as the price of preserving fed-
eralism in family law. "The Founders created a system that allowed the 
people to pass laws that the Founders themselves mayor may not have 
approved of. That is democracy."l34 Thus, while they would bar and abol-
ish same-sex marriage in the United States, they would tolerate and permit 
state legislatures to legalize same-sex domestic partnership, civil union, or 
benefit programs. 
Advocates of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment argue that 
the language of the amendment goes as far as is practical in banning same-
sex marriage. It takes the strongest position possible that is politically fea-
sible. Thus, they argue that to try further to ban same-sex civil unions or 
domestic partnerships would overreach. 135 
E. General Criticisms of the Federal Marriage Amendment 
Opponents and critics of the Federal Marriage Amendment have as-
serted at least nine arguments criticizing the proposal. These criticisms 
dispute the substantive prohibition of same-sex marriage, oppose the struc-
tural diminution of federalism in family law, and challenge the proposal's 
pragmatic political prospects. 
First, the widest and most vigorous reason for opposition to the Fed-
eral Marriage Amendment probably is substantive-because it would pre-
vent the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States of America. 
While gays are a relatively small minority, they are very active and vocal, 
have many supporters in the academy and professionals, l36 and same-sex 
131. Arkes, supra n. 95, at 1 9. However, as noted infra in Parts ill & IV, there are many 
profound reasons for federalism other than the straw man of relativism's premise that there is no 
truth. 
132. Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49, at 1 16. 
133. Arkes, supra n. 95, at 1 6. 
134. Kurtz, Marriage's Best Chance, supra n. 49, at 14. 
135. George, supra n. 45, at 124 (it would offend some conservatives and democratic princi-
ples to limit state legislative authority to decide such issues); Bork, supra n. 46, at 110 ("To try to 
prevent legislatures from enacting permission for civil unions by constitutional amendment would 
be to reach too far."). 
136. For example, legal academic and professional publications overwhelmingly favor legali-
zation of same-sex marriage. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional 
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.D. L. Rev. 1, 18-23 (1996); Ty Clevenger, Gay Ortho-
doxy and Academic Heresy, 14 Regent D. L. Rev. 241 (2001-02). 
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marriage is a popular notion in some segments of the population.137 Thus, 
Andrew Sullivan argues that legalizing same-sex marriage will increase the 
number of stable, monogamous gay unions, and "its stabilizing ripples 
[will] spread[] through both the [gay] subculture and the wider society."138 
Gay conservative columnist Jonathan Rauch likewise argues that same-sex 
marriage "will have many of the same domesticating and healthful effects 
on homosexuals as on heterosexuals," and "will give stability and care and 
comfort to millions of homosexuals at little or no cost to anyone else."139 
Thus, Sullivan and Rauch and other gay marriage proponents oppose the 
FMA because they believe that it embodies bad marriage policy. 140 
Second, some conservative critics argue that the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment does not go far enough because it only bans formal 
same-sex marriage but it does not ban de facto equivalents such as civil 
unions and extension of marital benefits to same-sex couples. Robert 
Knight opposes "[a]nything short of an amendment protecting marriage and 
its benefits from tampering,"141 and argues that, just as "[t]he authors of the 
13th Amendment added the phrase 'involuntary servitude' to the ban on 
slavery, lest anyone get ideas about practicing slaveholding in all but 
137. For example, recent polls in Massachusetts and New Hampshire purport to show that at 
least 50% of the residents surveyed favored legalizing same-sex marriage. See ACLU, State Pub-
lic Opinion from States on Civil Marriage and Other Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 
"New Hampshire," http://www.aclu.org/getequallffmlsection78/8B4Summary.pdf (accessed Mar. 
29, 2005); Frank Philipps, Support for Gay Marriage, Boston Globe (Apr. 8, 2003) (Massachu-
setts residents favor legalization of gay marriage 50%-44%); but see Mass News, Globe 
Ombudsman Admits 'Pol!' on Gay Marriage Was 'Problematic', http://www.massnews.coml2003 
_Editions/4_April/041103_mn~lobe_admits_poILproblematic.shtml (Apr. 11, 2003) (Boston 
Globe ombudsman admitted that poll question whether same-sex marriage should be "legally 
sanctioned" was confusing because "sanctioned" can mean either "punished" or "allowed"). 
138. Andrew Sullivan, Unveiled'j[ 9, http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/sullivan/sullivan9. 
html (accessed Apr. 3, 2005). Sullivan cites the experience of Denmark and argues that gay 
monogamists "may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would 
surely grow." Id. at'j[ 7. 
139. Rauch, Give Federalism a Chance, supra n. 64, at'j[ 2, 8. 
140. See Andrew Sullivan, Leave the Constitution Alone: A Response to Stanley Kurtz 'j[ 23, 
http://www.andrewsullivan.comlmain_article.php?artnum=2002121 0 (Dec. 10, 2002). 
Id. 
The denial of marriage rights to gay people is, in my view, immoral, inequitable, unjust, 
and unfair. Under the current definition of marriage-it doesn't have to produce chil-
dren, it doesn't have to be entered into for life, adultery doesn't invalidate it, child abuse 
doesn't invalidate it, it can be denied no-one who's straight-the exclusion of responsi-
ble, caring, committed, adult gay couples is an outrage. Given who else is constitution-
ally allowed to marry-convicts, dead-beat dads, multiple divorcees, teenagers, illegal 
aliens-the exception carved out for gay people is simply irrational. It certainly seems 
to me to be an odd priority if your concern is maintaining the institution of marriage 
itself. If that were really the issue, conservatives would be pressing right now for a 
federal amendment to restrict divorce, or to withhold marriage rights from people al-
ready divorced more than once, or to child-abusers or wife-beaters or dead-beat dads or 
moms. But they choose to pick on the mere hundreds of gay and lesbian couples just 
trying to live a stable and fulfilling life under the law. I want to know how sensible 
conservatives can justify these double standards. 
141. Knight, It's a Sin, supra n. 62, at'j[ 14 (emphasis added). 
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name,"142 so also the FMA should not only ban same-sex marriage but 
should provide that "there is no 'right' to create counterfeit marriage by 
other means, whether through a legislature or a court decision."143 He ar-
gues that the Federal Marriage Amendment 
may be well intentioned, but it allows for legislatures to enact the 
rest of the homosexual agenda right up to civil unions and other 
forms of counterfeit marriage. As written, the amendment will 
give politicians cover while they promote homosexuality by other 
means. . . . Marriage is too important to be defended in name 
only. 144 
Professor Emeritus Charles Rice agrees, in principle. 145 He argues that 
"[t]he campaign to adopt such an amendment would be morally corruptive 
because it would implicitly legitimize gay marriage by the incoherent con-
tention that somehow gay marriage is acceptable if voted by a legislature 
under a different label but not if voted by a court under any label."146 
The narrowness of the FMA is a source of much conservative criti-
cism. If functional same-sex marriages-marriages in substance but with a 
different label such as "civil union" or "domestic partnership"-will do as 
or nearly as much actual harm to society and families as formal same-sex 
marriages, the abolition of only formal same-sex marriages in sentence one 
of the proposed Amendment is a legitimate concern. Likewise, if legalizing 
such unions will do irreparable damage to society and its members even if 
that is accomplished by legislation or executive agency decision, an aboli-
tion of all such relationships in law-like the abolition of slavery-might 
be preferable to the restriction on judicial legalization of such unions pro-
vided by sentence two of the Federal Marriage Amendment. Also, the 
FMA mandates only one element-gender-of the definition of marriage. 
It leaves federal and state judges free to legalize consanguinous unions and 
polygamy, for example. 
The problem of the erosion of federalism in family law and activist 
judicial decisions imposing their preferred "liberal" values mandating pref-
erence for "alternative" family relations upon states and communities by 
judicial decree is not limited to the definition of marriage. Federalism in 
family law was intended to preserve the authority of the state to regulate all 
areas of family relations, not just marriage. Thus, by singling out hetero-
sexual marriage for special protection from activist federal courts, and leav-
ing unprotected from those same activist judges any meaningful 
142. ld. at'J[ 10. 
143. ld. 
144. Knight, No Room for Compromise, supra n. 62, at'J[ 7. 
145. Rice, supra n. 63, at 110 ("[Ilt would be imprudent, if not reckless, to anticipate that 
problem by offering an amendment that would confirm the constitutional validity of same-sex 
'marriage' any time a legislature so votes as long as it calls it by a different name."). 
146. ld. 
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federalism-as supporters of the FMA see it-and leaving exposed to con-
tinuing judicial interference state regulation of the great bulk and balance of 
family law-including, without limitation, nonmarital cohabitation, adop-
tion, paternity, parentage presumptions, the regulation of economic and 
noneconomic dimensions of ongoing spousal relations, the regulation of ec-
onomic and noneconomic dimensions of ongoing parent-child relations, 
child abuse, neglect, and dependency, domestic violence, separation, di-
vorce, property division, alimony, child custody and visitation, and child 
support-critics fear the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment might 
concede those issues to federal control and thereby distort federalism in 
family law. 
Third, many opponents of the Federal Marriage Amendment argue that 
the Federal Marriage Amendment "is a broadside against federalism, and 
that states should be allowed to go their own ways."147 Professor Rice ar-
gues: "The definition and regulation of marriage, under the original Consti-
tution, was and remains a matter for determination by the states. It ought to 
remain there."148 Leaders of two prominent national bar association family 
law groups also oppose the Federal Marriage Amendment because it vio-
lates the doctrine of federalism in family law. Sharon Corbitt, the head of 
the American Bar Association's Family Law Section, expressed opposition 
to the FMA because it would provide a national solution for a matter that 
best should be dealt with at the state level. Ms. Corbitt compared the FMA 
to creating national child support guidelines, which "would not be appropri-
ate, because per capita incomes vary from state to state . . . . For the same 
reasons, [a Federal Marriage Amendment is inappropriate because] social 
mores [also] vary."149 Likewise, Ernie Z. Carter, the leader of the predomi-
nantly Black National Bar Association's Family Law Section, expressed the 
same concern: "I am of the opinion that the federal government does not 
need to be so intrinsically involved in the personal lives of people."150 
While it is clear that a large majority of the American people oppose 
legalization of same-sex unions,151 a significant minority of activist judges 
147. Rauch, Getting It Right, supra n. 64, at'll 1. "I suggested that the problem of activist 
federal judges foisting one state's gay marriages on the whole country is easily remedied with a 
narrower constitutional amendment barring them from doing just that." Id. "I favor a federalist 
approach that lets some state experiment with same-sex marriage when it feels the time and cir-
cumstances are right." Rauch, Give Federalism a Chance, supra n. 64, 'I! 8. 
148 .. Rice, supra n. 63, at 109. "[T]he states' rights solution is inappropriate for abortion but 
appropriate for marriage" because prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), protection of the 
right to life was already a matter of federal constitutional law under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but regulation of marriage has always been a matter of state law. Id. 
149. Cahill, supra n. 15, at'll 13. 
150. Id. 
151. When asked, "[w]ould you favor or oppose a law that would allow homosexual couples 
to legally form civil unions, giving them some of the legal rights of married couples?" 49% of the 
respondents answered "yes" and 49% answered "no." Frank Newport, Six in 10 Americans Agree 
that Gay Sex Should Be Legal fig. 8, http://www.gailup.com/poil; search Frank Newport (June 27, 
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desire to force the states to accept same-sex marriage or marriage-like un-
ions.152 Many people will likely agree that the substantive values that un-
derlie the Federal Marriage Amendment-opposition to legalization of 
same-sex marriage or quasi-marital civil unions or domestic partnerships-
are sound and reasonable and represent the best interests and traditions of 
family law, but some are concerned that the Federal Marriage Amendment 
may erode federalism in family law. The remedy of establishing afederal 
constitutional rule prohibiting state judges to interpret state law to create 
domestic partnerships or same-sex unions would alter our traditional feder-
alism and could invite further inroads toward federalizing domestic 
relations. 
Fourth, as to the argument that the constitutionality of the federal and 
state DOMAs willbe challenged in the courts, opponents of the FMA argue 
that everything is challenged in court, so that is not a good justification for 
panicking and minimizing federalism in family law.153 Thus, Jonathan 
Rauch expresses confidence "that the courts will uphold the act; I just can't 
see this or any foreseeable Supreme Court imposing gay marriage nation-
ally by fiat."154 
Fifth, as to the argument that activist state courts will thwart the demo-
cratic processes and will try to judicially impose same-sex marriage or do-
mestic partnership upon the states, opponents of the FMA argue that 
federalism requires that we leave it to the people of each state to work it out 
for themselves. If state courts defy the will of the people, it is for them to 
correct the problem, not for the federal government to do so. 155 
Sixth, some opponents of the FMA argue that it is too early for such a 
drastic step. Professor Rice argues that we should "consider the proposal of 
an unequivocal definition of marriage, binding all government units, only if 
2003). When asked, "[d]o you think marriages between homosexuals should· or should not be 
recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?" the number answer-
ing "no" jumps to 62%. Longitudinal u.s. Public Opinion Polls, Same-Sex Marriage & Civil 
Unions 1 6, http://www.religioustolerance.orglhom_po1l5.htrn (accessed Mar. 29, 2005). When 
asked "[d]o you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be 
legal?" 37% of Americans still think homosexual sodomy should be illegal. Frank Newport, Six 
in 10 Americans Agree that Gay Sex Should Be Legal fig. 1. To the question, "[d]o you feel that 
homosexuality should be considered an acceptable alternative lifestyle or not?," 43% responded 
that they felt it was "not acceptable" while 53% responded that it was "acceptable." Id. at fig. 6. 
152. See e.g. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 55 (same-sex marriage must be legalized unless state 
can show compelling state interest); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *22 (Haw. 
App. Dec. 3, 1996) (ordering state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Brause v. 
Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at *3-5 (Ark. Feb. 27, 1998) 
(both privacy and equality provisions of Alaska Constitution require rejection of state's motion for 
summary judgment in same-sex marriage suit); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 866-67 (Vt. 1999) 
(either marriage or an equivalent status must be made available to same-sex couples). 
153. Rauch, Give Federalism a Chance, supra n. 64, at 1 9; see also Sen. Jud. Comm., On 
Amending the Constitution to Define Marriage (Mar. 23, 2004) (testimony of Cass R. Sunstein) 
(available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1118&wiUd=3185). 
154. Rauch, Give Federalism a Chance, supra n. 64, at 19. 
155. See Rauch, Getting It Right, supra n. 64, at 1 4. 
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the Supreme Court throws down the gauntlet by ruling unconstitutional a 
state's man-woman definition of marriage."156 Some suggest other alterna-
tives, such as "removal of the Court's appellate jurisdiction over such cases, 
under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution," a la Ex parte McCardle. 15? 
Seventh, the text of the Federal Marriage Amendment literally only 
bans one judicial remedy-requiring the extension of marital status or the 
legal incidents thereof to unmarried couples or groups. This could be nar-
rowly construed. Creative opponents of the Federal Marriage Amendment 
might obtain the same result by other means (different remedies) if the Fed-
eral Marriage Amendment were enacted. While this would clearly contra-
dict the purpose and policy of the FMA, the language of the FMA might not 
prohibit it. Thus, the Federal Marriage Amendment might not accomplish 
its goal because it might not effectively stop judges from declaring uncon-
stitutional or from enjoining enforcement of laws that extend marital status 
or benefits only to male-female couples. 
Eighth, by providing a federal constitutional limitation on the defini-
tion of marriage, effectively a constitutional negative on same-sex marriage, 
the Federal Marriage Amendment may open the door to even more, and 
possibly more intrusive, federal court, as well as state judicial, interpreta-
tion of the definition of marriage. Thus, the Federal Marriage Amendment 
has the potential to backfire. By federalizing at least part of marriage law, 
by making at least part of the definition of marriage a matter of U.S. consti-
tutional interpretation, the Federal Marriage Amendment puts the ultimate 
resolution of critical marriage issues into the hands of the very persons-
judges-who are least likely to be sympathetic to or respectful of the values 
of traditional marriage or respect for the groups that support it and against 
whom the proposed Amendment is directed. When federal judges have as-
sumed responsibility to set policy on family issues (abortion, unwed fathers, 
adoption, etc.), they have tended to mandate policies that prefer individual 
lifestyle choices o'ver family relations and responsibilities.15s This track re-
cord is not very appealing. 
Ninth, it may be unrealistic to think that two-thirds of both houses of 
Congress and three-fourths of the states would support the Federal Marriage 
Amendment-for at least some time. The fact that less than a simple ma-
jority of the Republican-controlled Senate voted for Sen. Jt. Res. 40 in the 
summer of 2004, an election year,159 shows that a great deal of work re-
mains to be done before the FMA is a serious contender for passage and 
ratification. Cynics and opponents interpret this as not an auspicious begin-
ning, and say it does not bode well for the political future of the Federal 
156, Rice, supra n, 63, at 110, 
157. Rice, supra n. 63, at 110, n. 124 (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868)). 
158, See infra Part VA 
159, See supra n, 31 and accompanying text. 
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Marriage Amendment, but it was just the initial engagement in a very long 
political battle. 
Part of the appeal of the Federal Marriage Amendment for some may 
be that it seems to be a one-shot-ends-the-war solution, but that is illusory. 
It may seem more appealing to try to win it all in one fell swoop than to toil 
away state-by-state, winning sometimes but losing sometimes. However, 
even the amendment must eventually be endorsed state-by-state, so a very 
long, laborious process involving extensive state-by-state work is 
inevitable. 
One thing that some of the criticisms of the FMA indicate is that the 
wording of the original FMA may need to be refined.16o The language may 
need to be recast. Disagreements over expression and language may need 
to be resolved. The form and wording may continue to evolve and improve. 
Regardless of the particular wording or version, the gist of the FMA is that 
marriage is defined as a conjugal union exclusively, that the courts may not 
compel the extension of marital status or of marital incidents, benefits, du-
ties, rights, and privileges that constitute the corpus of legal marriage to 
other kinds of domestic unions, but that legislatures may resolve questions 
about whether and if so what other status and/or what benefits may be ex-
tended to nonmarital relationships. 
F. The Core Federalism Controversy Over the Federal Marriage 
Amendment 
Federalism is a major issue in the controversy over the Federal Marriage 
Amendment in at least five different ways.161 First, it is clear that the pro-
posed Federal Marriage Amendment would strip states-as well as the fed-
eral government-of the ability to legalize same-sex marriage. Whether this 
is wise or not as a matter of reducing state and federal government powers 
is one controversy. Second, as a matter of uniform federal constitutional 
law, it would limit the ability of state courts to create or recognize alterna-
tive domestic relations status for same-sex couples, such as civil unions or 
domestic partnership. Only state legislatures could clearly do so. Whether 
this is wise or not as a matter of allocation of state and federal government 
powers is a matter of controversy. Third, as a matter of uniform federal 
constitutional law , the FMA would limit the ability of state courts to extend 
particular benefits of incidents of marriage to nonmarital homosexual or 
heterosexual couples, such as marital testimonial privileges, custody, adop-
tion, support, and property division. Only state legislatures could clearly do 
160. For starters, as Professor Andrew Koppelman notes, the grammar of the original versions 
("or" instead of "nor") is poor. 
161. While it is unlikely that legal analysis will persuade many, if any, people regarding the 
substantive merits of the amendment (whether it goes too far, or not far enough, or just far enough 
in prohibiting same-sex marriage), certainly family law scholars and lawyers in general should be 
interested in and open-minded about the federalism issue. 
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so. Whether this is wise or not as a matter of reallocation of government 
authority also is a matter of controversy. 
Fourth, the justifiable cost of preserving federalism in family law also 
is a basic underlying issue. Liberal judges consider the cost too high when 
states enact or maintain family policies that infringe upon preferred, per-
sonal policy preferences and individual rights; conservative supporters of 
the FMA consider the cost too high when states, federal judges, or other 
authorities threaten to legalize same-sex marriage or when state judges 
mandate legalization of marriage-equivalent same-sex civil unions or exten-
sion of marital benefits. Consistent supporters of the doctrine of federalism 
in family law find themselves unpopular both with liberals (who support 
liberal federal policies and judicial rulings overriding state family laws) and 
now, perhaps surprisingly, with conservatives who support the FMA. 
Underlying most of the foregoing federalism issues is the question of 
the extent to which the doctrine of federalism in family law is still a valid, 
viable, and significant constitutional doctrine. That is the fifth federalism 
issue. Supporters of the Federal Marriage Amendment believe that federal-
ism in family law is a toothless old pussy cat, which courts, especially fed-
eral courts, disregard at will, and use only occasionally as window dressing, 
for rhetorical purposes. 162 
Thus, the vitality and viability of federalism in family law is a crucial 
key to the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. The validity of federal-
ism in family law is not certain anymore.163 It is involved in a contest 
between federalism and deference to historic state sovereignty in family law 
versus substantive due process and Lochnerism-social engineering by the 
federal judiciary. Whether federalism in family law is vindicated and reaf-
firmed as a potent and substantial protection for state family policies or 
disregarded and reduced to little more than. mere rhetoric will determine 
whether many conservatives and mainstream Americans will, or should, 
support the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. 164 
III. THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM IN F AMIL Y LAW 
. 
The answers to the federalism issues regarding the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment turn to a great extent upon whether the doctrine of 
federalism in family law is historically valid and currently respected. Thus, 
this Part analyzes the origins, developmental history, historic validity and 
current viability, of the doctrine of federalism in family law. 
"From the earliest days of the Republic ... family law has unquestion-
ably belonged to the states."165 Federalism in family law was a core reason 
162. See supra nn. 125-30 and accompanying text. 
163. See infra Part V.A. 
164. [d. 
165. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787 (1995). 
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for, a basic subject of, and a prime example of the Founders commitment to 
federalism. The Founders of the American Constitution were deeply suspi-
cious of the concentration of governmental power.166 In fact, "the great 
principle of the revolution was limited government."167 Because of the 
abuses they had experienced under the hands of King George's strong cen-
tral government, they were determined to spread and separate government 
authority in the United States of America. 168 The states were also jealous of 
their governmental authority; indeed, the strong reluctance of the states to 
relinquish their sovereignty was the primary reason for what Madison 
called the "radical infirmity" of the Articles of Confederation,169 which pre-
cipitated the convening of the Constitutional Convention. 170 
166. The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966) ("The accumula-
tion of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, 
or many ... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); The Federalist No. 51, at 
323 (James Madison) ("In a single republic, all tile power surrendered by the people, is submitted 
to ... a single goverrunent; and usurpations are guarded against by a division of the goverrunent 
into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, tile power surren-
dered by tile people is first divided between two distinct goverrunents ... Hence a double security 
arises to tile rights of the people. The different goverrunents will control each otiler; at tile same 
time that each will be controlled by itself."); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth 1. Cisar, "If Angels 
Were to Govern": The Needfor Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke 
L.J. 449, 450-51 (1991) ("[T]he body of tile Constitution-tile document to which the Framers 
devoted so much time and energy at the Convention in Philadelphia-contained precious few 
direct references to the protection of individual rights. [Instead,] the Framers were virtually ob-
sessed witil a fear-bordering on what some might uncharitably describe as paranoia-of tile 
concentration of political power. Almost every aspect of tileir ingenious political structure was in 
some way related to tileir implicit assumption that, simply put, 'power corrupts.' "). 
167. Edward C. Banfield, Federalism and the Dilemma of Popular Government, in How Fed-
eral1s the Constitution 1, 13 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., Am. Enter. for 
Pub. Policy Research 1987). 
168. "The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these 
States." The Declaration of Independence [<[ 2] (1776); see also Marci A. Hamilton, "Separa-
tion": From Epithet to Constitutional Norm, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1433, 1450 (2002) ("The constitu-
tional structure adopted at the Constitutional Convention rested on a deep distrust of every entity 
holding power. Discussion revolved around [not just] how to organize a national goverrunent and 
designate national leaders but to place them in positions where they would be deterred from abus-
ing tile new powers given them. Power had to be given, but it made the Framers nervous, having 
witnessed the serial abuses of power by King George ill, tile English Parliament, the state execu-
tives, tile state legislatures, and even the people. They limited power, they enumerated power, and 
they separated power."); see also Aaron J. O'Brien, States' Repeal: A Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment to Reinvigorate Federalism, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 547,551-52 (1996) (The colonists 
first complaint "was tile extensive control over tile individual colonies by England's central gov-
errunent" and consequently that "after their shocking victory over tile Mother Country, tile colo-
nists established an American government with essentially no central power."). 
169. James Madison, A Sketch Never Finished nor Applied, in Notes of Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787 Reported By James Madison 3, 7 (Ohio U. Press 1966) (This was Madison's 
Preface to his Notes of tile Philadelphia deliberations). 
170. The resolution passed by Congress that convened the Philadelphia Convention read: 
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that on the second Monday in 
May next a Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by tile several states 
be held at Philadelphia for tile sole and express purpose of revising tile Articles of 
Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations 
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The purpose of the convention was to create a stronger national gov-
ernment, to reduce the power of the states in order to strengthen the national 
government, but not to eliminate the states. As Madison put it in the Feder-
alist Papers, the new constitutional government was to be part national and 
part federal. 171 
One of the purposes of giving the national government more power 
was to enable it to protect basic rights of the American citizens against 
abuses by, inter alia, the states. In 1787 marriage was not threatened or 
abused by government, so it is not surprising that the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights make no reference to marriage. Those documents protect the 
vulnerable valued institutions and rights that were threatened and which had 
been abused by the states and the British government in recent history-
press, speech, religion, assembly, jury trial, quartering troops, etc. Today 
there is little threat of forcible quartering troops in private homes, but the 
institution of conjugal marriage is threatened. It makes as much sense to 
adopt constitutional protection for marriage today as it did in 1787 to adopt 
constitutional protection for speech, private residences, jury trials, etc. 
It seems never to have occurred to any of the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 that the national government should or would 
have the power to directly regulate family relations. It is clear that they 
believed that they were forming a government that would have power over 
national interests, primarily in external matters-foreign relations and de-
fense-and internal matters concerning national economic and military-
quelling rebellions-concerns. The regulation of family matters was never 
discussed in the Philadelphia convention. However, there was common 
consensus that under the Constitution the States would retain plenary gov-
ernmental authority to regulate matters of local concern-which include 
family law. Likewise, in the ratification debates in the various states, the 
issue of the extent of state sovereignty that would remain under the Consti-
tution was a major source of controversy and debate. Again, there is little 
discussion of family law, but there are clear indications that the participants 
and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states 
render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preser-
vation of the Union. 
Resolution of Congress, February 21, 1787, in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 
vol. 3, 13-14 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale U. Press 1937); see also Confederation Congress Calls the 
Constitutional Convention, 21 February 1787, in The Documentary History of the Ratification of 
the Constitution vol. 1, 185, 187 (Merrill Jensen ed., Worzalla Publg. Co. 1976). 
171. The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) ("In a single republic, all the power 
surrendered by the people is submitted to ... a single government; and the usurpations are guarded 
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound 
republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct 
governments . . . . Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."). 
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in these debates fully understood and universally agreed that the regulation 
of family relations would remain a matter of state controU72 
The text of the Tenth Amendment explicitly embodies the federalism 
principle: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."173 Thus, federalism is an express constitutional 
principle underlying the 1787 charter and incorporated explicitly in the Bill 
172. Forrest McDonald writes: 
Broadly speaking, the powers that the states retained fell under the rubric 'internal po-
lice,' or simply the police power: the states had the powers of the polis. These included 
not only the definition and punishment of crimes and the administration of justice but 
also all matters concerning the health, manners, morals, safety, and welfare of the citi-
zenry. Despite the assertion of some anti-Federalists, the states retained the police pow-
ers exclusively. These powers were nearly unlimited. 
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 288 (U. 
Press of Kan. 1985). 
On June 28, 1788 at the New York ratification convention Hamilton addressed concerns over the 
Supremacy Clause declaring that it means 
no more than this-that the Constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, cannot be 
controlled or defeated by any other law. The acts of the United States, therefore, will be 
absolutely obligatory as to all the proper objects and powers of the general govern-
ment. . .. [B]ut the laws of Congress are restricted to a certain sphere, and when they 
depart from this sphere, they are no longer supreme or binding. In the same marmer the 
states have certain independent powers, in which their laws are supreme; for example, in 
making and executing laws concerning the punishment of certain crimes, such as mur-
der, theft, etc. 
Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution vol. II, 362 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed., Burt 
Franklin 1888) [hereinafter Debates vol. II]. 
On June 30, 1788 at the New York convention Robert R. Livingston addressed those who argued 
"that the state governments will be destroyed, because they will have no powers left them. This is 
new. Is the power over property nothing? Is the power over life and death no power? Let me ask 
what powers this Constitution would take from the states." Mter some further arguments Living-
ston concluded that the Constitution preserved the states "as parts of the system, 'for local pur-
poses. . . . The truth is, the states, and the United States, have distinct objects. They are both 
supreme. As to national objects, the latter is supreme; as to internal and domestic objects, the 
former.'" Id. at 384-85. At the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, James Iredell stressed 
continually that all powers not delegated to the national government "or to the departments of the 
general government" are retained by the states. The Debates on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution vol. IV, 249 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d.ed., Burt Franklin 1888) [hereinafter Debates 
vol. IV]. Iredell compared the Constitution to "a great power of attorney, under which no power 
can be exercised but what is expressly given." Id. at 148. Iredell also assured the North Carolina 
ratifying convention that "[ w lith the mere internal concerns of a State, Congress are to have 
nothing to do." Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 
695,698 n. 21 (1996) (citation omitted). William Davie, another delegate to the federal Conven-
tion, told the North Carolina ratifying convention, "[t]here is not a single instance of a power 
given to the United States, whereby the internal policy or administration of the states is affected." 
Debates vol. IV, supra, at 160. One delegate to the Massachusetts ratification convention argued 
that the Constitution was "only a consolidation of strength, and that it was apparent Congress had 
no right to alter the internal relations of a state. The design in amending the Confederation ... 
was to remedy its defects." Debates vol. II, supra, at 78 (paraphrasing Col. Varnum). 
173. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
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of Rights, and family law is the prime example of the areas "reserved to the 
States" for regulation. 174 
Political writers read by the Founders also supported the local regula-
tion of matters such as family relations. 175 In the prevailing political the-
ory, the family was one of the "pillars of republican virtue,"176 and it not 
only needed to be nurtured, but also protected from the tyranny of the cen-
tral government. 
Early Americans believed that each of us must be taught virtue in 
our local communities. Because they understood the bases of vir-
tue to be primarily moral rather than political, early Americans 
believed that the state should promote other institutions, espe-
cially the public worship and private instruction of religion, in 
which virtue would be directly inculcated. In addition to promot-
ing religion, people generally believed the main task of govern-
ment was to foster and protect the multitude of associations in 
which proper character was formed. l77 
The writings of the Founders themselves confirmed this view of the 
role of state and family. Thomas Jefferson viewed the States as "the most 
competent administrations for our domestic concerns & the surest bulwarks 
against antirepublican tendencies."178 John Adams observed: 
The foundation of national Morality must be laid in private Fami-
lies .. " How is it possible that Children can have any just Sense 
of the sacred Obligations of Morality or Religion if, from their 
earliest Infancy, they learn their Mothers live in habitual Infidel-
ity to their fathers, and their fathers in as constant Infidelity to 
their Mothers?179 
Likewise, 
George Mason argued that republican government was based on 
an affection 'for altars and firesides.' Only good men could be 
174. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1466 (1987) 
("The language of the Tenth Amendment simply distilled the underlying structural logic of the 
original Constitution: Wherever authorized by its own state constitution, a state government can 
enact any law not inconsistent with the federal Constitution and constitutional federal laws."). 
175. "Edmund Burke noted that 'to be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we 
belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affection.'" Raoul 
Berger, Federalism: The Founders Design 55 (U. of Okla. Press 1987) (citing Edmund Burke, 
Reflections on the Revolution in France 195 (Harvard Classics 1909». 
176. Gerald J. Russello, Liberal Ends and RepUblican Means, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 740,756 
(1997) (reviewing Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford U. 
Press 1997) (two pillars of republican virtue were religion and family»; see generally Dailey, 
supra n. 165, at 1835-51 (linking state control of family matters to nurturing republican virtue). 
177. Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility: Pluralism and Community in 
Early America, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 931, 941-42 (1995). 
178. David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson 185 (U. Press of Va. 
1994). 
179. John Adams, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams vol. IV, 123 (L.H. Butterfield, et 
al. eds., Atheneum 1964). 
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free; men learned how to be good in a variety of local institu-
tions-by the fIresides as well as at the altar . . . . Individuals 
learned virtue in their families, churches, and schools.180 
173 
Federalism in family law supported the cultivation of virtue in local 
communities, and virtue was the indispensable substructure upon which 
rested the superstructure of freedom and liberty under law. Thus, marriage 
has been a critical constitutional foundational unit since the founding. As 
historian Nancy Cott has written about the importance of marriage in the 
founding era. "In the beginning of the United States, the founders had a 
political theory of marriage. So deeply embedded in political assumptions 
that it was rarely voiced as a theory, it was all the more important. It occu-
pied the place where political theory overlapped with common sense."181 It 
remains so today. 
IV. THE ApPARENT WANING OF FEDERALISM IN FAMILY LAW 
While the echoes of family law federalism in many Supreme Court 
decisions are loud and clear, at the same time there have been numerous 
decisions by the Court that have had the direct or indirect effect of "federal-
izing"-in some cases "constitutionalizing"-family laws. There also has 
been a steady increase for decades in congressional and executive expan-
sion of federal law regulating family relations.182 As one Michigan family 
lawyer wrote: "We are inundated with federal laws that on a day-to-day 
basis affect our practice of family law."183 The volume of federal law that 
impacts on the practice of family law in the states is becoming so massive, 
he suggests, "that someday we may have a specialty where lawyers will 
limit their practice to the federal aspects of family law."184 
Thus, it is no wonder that Professor Dailey writes: 
Until most recently, the principle of federalism and the law of 
domestic relations appeared to be following the same well-worn 
path in the direction of an all-embracing nationalism. In both 
fields, the traditional virtues of state sovereignty had been dis-
placed, if not banished altogether, by an increasingly powerful 
ideal of national supremacy.18S 
180. Frohnen, supra n. 177, at 947-48 (quoting George Mason, Opposition to a Unitary Exec-
utive, in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates 47 (Ralph 
Ketcham ed., New Am. Lib. 1986». 
181. Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows, A History of Marriage and the Nation 9 (Harvard U. Press 
2000). "The republican theory of the United States ... g[a]ve marriage a political reason for 
being." Id. at 10. 
182. Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a Quest for Policy, 33 
Fam. L. Q. 843, 847-48 (1999). 
183. Norman N. Robbins, The "Feds" Are Still Coming, 31 Mich. Fam. LJ. 4 (Feb. 2002). 
184. Id. 
185. Dailey, supra n. 165, at 1788. 
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James Buchanan concurs: "[IJn the 20th century, constitutional guaran-
tees against federal encroachment on the authority of states were under-
mined by executive, legislative, and judicial departures from established 
principles. At the century's end, therefore, the status quo is clearly on the 
[centralized unitary polity J side of the spectrum." 186 
A. The Federalization of Family Law by Judicial Interpretation 
Professor Jill Elaine Hasday has observed: "[IJt is . . . striking how 
often the Court's constitutional decisions have established uniform family 
law policies for the nation, the Justices' professed commitment to exclusive 
localism notwithstanding."187 Susan Kuo suggests: "Over the course of the 
twentieth century . . . the Court shed its earlier reluctance and began to 
assume a greater supervisory role . . . . Significant transformations in 
American family life likely convinced the Court to become more active in 
constructing family law rules."188 However, Justice Potter Stewart once 
noted that "[iJssues involving the family ... are among the most difficult 
that courts have to face, involving as they often do serious problems of 
policy disguised as questions of constitutional law." 189 Likewise, Professor 
Robert F. Nagle has analyzed the role of the Court in the weakening of 
federalism and has suggested an institutional blind spot. 
[TJhe current focus on the Supreme Court as protector of states is 
a sign, not of resurgent state power, but of a depleted political 
imagination .... [FJederal judges do not and cannot appreciate a 
robust federalism. Indeed, in many ways the court's place in our 
governmental structure and, even more importantly, its intellec-
tual and professional dispositions disqualify the justices from any 
significant part in nurturing a strong form of federalism. 190 
The constitutionalization of family law began in 1923, when the Su-
preme Court was at the apex of using "substantive due process" to strike 
down economic regulations that restricted rights of property owners. The 
186. James M. Buchanan, Federalism and Individual Sovereignty, IS The Cato J., No. 2-3, 
FalllWinter 1996 124, http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjlSn2-3/cjlSn2-3-8.pdf (accessed Apr. 
26,2005). Contra Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 Santa Clara L. Rev. 379, 
404 (2001) ("The federal government has only made limited intrusions into family law."). 
187. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 4S UCLA L. Rev. 1297, 
1373 (1998). 
188. Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy, Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teenage Sex? 89 
Ky. LJ. 135, 168 n. 149 (2000-01); see also Eva R. Rubin, The Supreme Court and the American 
Family 11-26, 183-199 (Greenwood Press 1986) (describing transformation of the model of fam-
ily relations expressed in or underlying Supreme Court decisions in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and applauding the Court for changing to adopt a model accepting alternative family 
styles, structures, roles, and practices). 
189. Parham v. l.R., 442 U.S. S84, 624-25 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) (upholding a Geor-
gia law allowing parents to commit their children to mental institutions on medical referral with-
out formal legal hearing). 
190. Robert F. Nagle, The Implosion of American Federalism 11 (Oxford U. Press 2001). 
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Court also declared that the term "liberty" included the right to establish 
and exercise family relationships. In Meyer v. Nebraska,191 the Court re-
viewed the conviction of a private parochial school teacher for violating a 
Nebraska law that prohibited teaching any foreign language to children 
under sixteen years old. The Court viewed the law as interfering with the 
right of parents to rear· and educate their children as they saw fit, and they 
determined that parental right was a fundamental "liberty" specially pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice McReynolds, the author 
of the Court's opinion, put it: 
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration 
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. 
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men. 192 
This original example of the constitutionalization of family law by ju-
dicial interpretation was soon followed by many others.193 Since 1923, the 
191. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
192. Id. at 399 (emphasis added). 
193. See e.g. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (state grandparent visitation law uncon-
stitutional as applied); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (spousal notice require-
ment for abortion, even with substantial exceptions and exemptions, is unconstitutional); Hodgson 
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (requirement that both parents be notified before abortion on 
minor child unconstitutional); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (state prison's near-ban on 
prisoner marriages unconstitutional); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431-34 (1984) (racial 
prejudice cannot be factor in resolving custody dispute between biological parents); Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-102 (1982) (invalidating state statute of limitations requiring that 
paternity suit for purposes of obtaining child support for illegitimate child must be brought within 
one year of birth); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (declaring that state may 
terminate parental rights only on a showing of clear and convincing evidence); Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94 (1979) (invalidating state statute permitting unwed mother, but not 
unwed father, to block adoption of their child by withholding consent); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 375-77 (1978) (state statute requiring persons subject to child support obligations to 
obtain court approval before marrying on proof of ability to support existing children); Carey v. 
Population Servs. Inti., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (state laws restricting the use of contracep-
tives unconstitutional); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506 (1977) (city 
housing ordinance barring extended family members from living together in some circumstances 
invalid); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental and spousal consent to 
abortion is unconstitutional); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-17 (1975) (state child support law 
providing that daughters attain majority at 18 but sons attain majority at 21 unconstitutional); 
Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 649-59 (1972) (state practice of taking custody of children of unwed 
father, absent hearing and particularized finding that father was unfit parent unconstitutional); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (state law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives 
to single persons violated the Equal Protection clause); Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971) 
(divorce filing fee for indigents unconstitutional); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (law 
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Supreme Court has rendered scores of decisions invalidating laws directly 
or indirectly regulating family relations as violative of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and many times that number of lower court cases have been decided in 
which family laws or policies have been challenged as violating some con-
stitutional rule, doctrine, or principle incorporating or protecting a family 
law policy.194 Since the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, these 
decisions effectively have established constitutional boundaries for the reg-
ulation of family relations by all the states and the federal government. 
These judicial decisions undeniably have "nationalized" some standards for 
the state regulation of domestic relations and have mandated the imposition 
of certain values in state family law policies. 195 
The tempo and incidence of Supreme Court decisions "nationalizing" 
and "constitutionalizing" family law has increased in recent decades. The 
first Supreme Court case to mention marriage or child-rearing as a constitu-
tional right was decided in 1923. For the next forty years, the Supreme 
Court rarely decided more than two constitutional cases dealing with family 
law issues in any given term or year. For example, from 1945-1964, the 
Court averaged fewer than two family law decisions per term. During the 
activist years from 1965-1984, however, the Supreme Court rendered writ-
ten opinions in as many as twelve family law cases in a given year or term 
of Court, and averaged more than 5.5 family law decisions per term. Since 
then, the number of family law cases heard by the Court has averaged about 
3-4 decisions per year. This represents a significant "constitutionalization" 
of family law by judicial decision.196 
The paradigmatic example of the federalization and constitutionaliza-
tion of an area of domestic relations by the federal judiciary is Roe v. 
Wade,197 and the thirty-plus Supreme Court abortion decisions rendered in 
the past three decades. While abortion can be characterized in many ways, 
it undeniably is a family law subject inasmuch as it addresses fundamental 
family relations questions. Such questions include: whether an unborn 
child is a "child," for purposes of legal protection; whether abortion is a 
form of "child abuse;" the nature and extent of parent-child relations be-
tween the mother and the prenatal child; the nature, extent and due process 
barring distribution of contraceptives to married couples violates Equal Protection clause); Pierce 
v. Socy. of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 u.s. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidat-
ing compulsory public school attendance law). The author does not agree with all of these deci-
sions, but they illustrate the breadth of the Court's rulings overseeing state regulations of family 
relations. 
194. Lynn D. Wardle, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 63 Revista del Colegio de 
Abogados de Puerto Rico, 70, 76 (Jul.-Sept. 2002). The ABA Family Law Section magazine, 
Family Advocate provides a partial list noting 53 major Supreme Court decisions reflecting feder-
alization of, or federal interest in, family law. Supreme Court Cases, 23 Fam. Advoc. 15, 15-17 
(Spring 2001). 
195. Wardle, supra n. 194, at 76. 
196. [d. 
197. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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protections of the paternal interest of the father of the prenatal child; the 
balance of rights and responsibilities between husband and wife, or preg-
nant woman and boyfriend, regarding the decision to terminate the life of a 
jointly-conceived child; the extent of parental interests in the abortion deci-
sion of a pregnant minor, etc. Even members of the Court could not foresee 
in 1973 how totally overwhelming the judicially-created abortion doctrine 
would become, and how completely state abortion regulations would be 
monitored and controlled by the federal judiciary. For example, concurring 
in twin decisions Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,198 Chief Jus-
tice Burger justified his vote to declare the Texas abortion law and Geor-
gia's Model Penal Code-based abortions regulations unconstitutional with 
the reassuring statement: "I do not read the Court's holdings today as hav-
ing the sweeping consequences attributed to them by the dissenting Jus-
tices.,,199 For thirteen years thereafter he gamely tried to put the best face 
on the increasingly extreme judicial extensions of the abortion privacy doc-
trine.2OO Finally, in 1986, in the last abortion case he considered before 
retiring, Chief Justice Burger conceded that he had grossly underestimated 
the expansiveness of the abortion doctrine he had endorsed in Roe. In 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,201 he 
expressed his angry frustration in a dissenting opinion in which he con-
cluded that if the holding in that and other Supreme Court abortion deci-
sions "really mean what they seem to say, I agree we should reexamine 
Roe."202 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas203 
does not directly deal with federalism in family law, but it is relevant to 
both the federalism and same-sex marriage issues. In Lawrence, the Court 
by a 6-3 vote held that a Texas sodomy statute that criminally prohibited 
homosexual-but not heterosexual-sodomy violated an unwritten consti-
tutional liberty of consenting adults to engage in private sexual relation-
ships. The majority opinion was careful to note that the issue before the 
Court in Lawrence did not involve marriage204 and the concurring opinion 
of Justice O'Connor in dicta clearly indicated her view that the state had 
legal justification for limiting marriage to male-female couples.z°5 How-
ever, to the hints of the majority that the marriage issue could be viewed 
198. 410 U.s. 179 (1973). 
199. [d. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
200. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 481 (1977) (Burger, c.J., concurring) ("The Court's 
holdings in Roe . .. and Doe ... simply require that a State not create an absolute barrier to a 
woman's decision to have an abortion."). 
201. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
202. [d. at 785 (Burger, c.J., dissenting). 
203. 539 U.S. 558. 
204. [d. at 578 ("The present case does not involve minors .... It does not involve whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter."). 
205. [d. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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differently, the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia bluntly warned: "Do not 
believe it."206 He noted that the rationale of the majority opinion 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a 
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual un-
ions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If 
moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate 
state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct ... and if, 
as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), 
"[ w ]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with 
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal 
bond that is more enduring," ... what justification could there 
possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual 
couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution."207 
Thus, the doctrinal impact of Lawrence on claims seeking the judicial 
legalization of same-sex marriage is uncertain. However, it is telling that 
Lawrence was the first and most frequently cited Supreme Court decision 
mentioned in the Goodridge opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court mandating legalization of same-sex marriage.208 
The impact of the Lawrence decision can be evaluated in terms of the 
substantive policy result, the constitutional analysis, and the institutional 
impact. The policy result of the Lawrence case-that noncommercial ho-
mosexual relations in private by consenting adults should not be criminally 
proscribed-is certainly defensible; reasonable people have, can, and do 
disagree on the issue, and there are reasonable arguments on both sides of 
the issue, despite Justice Kennedy's breast-thumping insistence that there is 
no rational basis for disagreement with him on the issue; reasonable legisla-
tors in most states have adopted the same policy position the Court took, 
while legislators in more than one-quarter of the states maintained policies 
outlawing homosexual sex. Both dissenters acknowledged that the policy 
position of the majority is reasonable; Justice Scalia noted that legislators 
could reasonably choose either to decriminalize or prohibit homosexual 
sodomy,209 and Justice Thomas suggested that he thought the Texas law 
was "uncommonly silly."210 Thus, the policy result in Lawrence was not 
unreasonable. 
[Lawrence] does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any 
legitimate state interest here, such as ... preserving the traditional institution of mar-
riage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in 
this case-other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral 
disapproval of an excluded group. 
Id. at 585. 
206. [d. at 604 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, c.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
207. [d. at 604-05. 
208. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948, 953, 958-59, 961, 972, 978, 986-87. 
209. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 603-04 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
210. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The legal analysis of the Court in Lawrence is much more troubling. 
The Court resorted to substantive due process, a source of immense contro-
versy for decades, which the Court at one point, not too long ago, repudi-
ated as an illegitimate constitutional methodology,211 and which the Court 
has tried to cabin with historical tests?12 Since there is nothing in the text, 
history, or structure of the Constitution or deeply rooted in the traditions of 
the American people, the Lawrence decision is very questionable as a mat-
ter of legal analysis. The embarassing "historical" analysis of Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion turns on the remarkably weak-and inaccurate-
suggestion that because most laws for centuries have prohibited all forms of 
sodomy-both homosexual and heterosexual-the proscription of homo-
sexual sodomy is a modern invention. The flaw of that conclusion can be 
demonstrated by simply opening the Bible, including the legal books of the 
Old Testament, which clearly condemn, prohibit, and impose severe pun-
ishment for homosexual sodomy only!213 The rejection of "moral disap-
proval" as a basis for legislation is simply incoherent; as the dissent notes, 
citing Justice White's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, many laws are based 
first and primarily upon social (moral) disapproval and if that is the basis 
for striking down laws, the Courts will be busy, indeed?14 The majority 
opinion in Lawrence reeks of the inebriated indulgence of the majority and 
concurring justices in the illegitimate practice of imposing their personal 
policy preference under the guise of interpreting the Constitution. While 
the majority and concurring opinions in Lawrence patched together dicta 
taken from a number of prior cases to create a flimsy and transparent cloak 
for their result, this is not the first time the Court has stretched and strained 
its intoxicating power of judicial review by Lochner-izing?lS 
21l. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 502-03; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482; Ferguson v. Skropa, 372 U.S. 
726, 731 (1963). 
212. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
213. Leviticus 18:22 (King James) ("Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is 
abomination."); Leviticus 20:13 (King James) ("If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a 
woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their 
blood shall be upon them."); Deuteronomy 23:17 (King James) ("There shall be no whore of the 
daughters of Israel, nor a sodomite of the sons of IsraeL"); 2 Kings 23:7 (King James) ("And he 
brake down the houses of the sodomites."); see also Romans 1 :24-47 ("Wherefore God also gave 
them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies be-
tween themselves: ... For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women 
did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the 
natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that 
which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet."); 
Timothy 1:9-10 (King James) ("Knowing this, that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for 
the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for unholy and profane, for murderers 
of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile them-
selves with mankind."). These are just a few examples of condemnatory references to homosexual 
practices in the Old and New Testaments. 
214. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, c.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)). 
215. See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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However, the institutional implications of Lawrence are the mostradi-
cal and ominous dimensions of the decision. As a matter of the trust (and 
trustworthiness) of the judiciary, as a matter of the integrity of the process 
. of judicial review, as a matter of the separation of judicial from legislative 
powers, and as a matter of federal court respect for the legislative powers of 
the States, the Lawrence decision is a major train wreck. The Court simply 
disenfranchised, yet again, the citizens-in Texas and effectively in a dozen 
other states-and by implication citizens in all states-who believed in, and 
as citizens, voters, and representatives had supported and worked through 
the democratic process to maintain the historic policy that homosexual rela-
tions are illegal. Once again, as it has in dozens of other cases in the past 
forty years dealing with abortion, pornography, school prayer, religious 
rights, contraception, and other sexual issues, the Court told social conserv-
atives that their votes do not count, that their voices do not matter, that they 
are disenfranchised, that democracy does not include them, and that they 
are not fully citizens any more than Dred Scott was. The Court has repeat-
edly told social conservatives that if they participate in American democ-
racy and actually succeed in maintaining or establishing traditional moral 
values in law, the Supreme Court will not allow those laws to stand if they 
offend the modern sensibilities or policy preferences of a majority of the 
justices. While criminal sex codes like the Texas law involved in Lawrence 
are not usually included in descriptions of family law, the regulation of 
sexual behavior is closely related to what marriage laws and some related 
family laws-such as adultery, incest, bigamy, and age-of-consent laws-
are about. By overriding on such flimsy constitutional grounds the Texas 
sodomy law which was similar to the criminal laws against homosexual 
behavior that all of the States had at the time the Constitution was written 
and all the States had at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, 
the Court decision conveys· a disrespect for the principle of federalism that 
bodes ominously for Americans who care about the viability of federalism 
in family law. 
B. The Federalization of Family Law by Congressional Legislation 
The federalization of family law by congressional legislation is not 
new. More than twenty years ago, Professor Kenneth R. Redden wrote: 
"For two centuries American lawyers could safely rely on state law alone in 
their advice to clients on a domestic relations matter. This is no longer 
possible since a vast new body of federal law (judicial, legislative and ad-
ministrative) has just been created in the last two decades."216 Noting the 
"breadth and depth" of federal laws he devoted more than 400 pages and 
216. Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Regulation of Family Law v (The Michie Co. 1982). 
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fifteen chapters to describing and categorizing "the complex area of federal 
regulation of family law," as it existed at the beginning of the 1980s.217 
Concerns about federalization of family law seem to be increasing. In 
1999, the editors of the Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers devoted an entire issue to the topic of "The Federalization of Fam-
ily Law,"218 and in 2001, an issue of the ABA Family Law Section's Fam-
ily Advocate also was devoted to federal laws regulating family practice.219 
The articles in these practitioner-oriented journals include discussions of 
federal regulation of child support,220 health issues,221 QDROs,222 child-
snatching,223 child abuse or neglect,224 child custody and visitation,225 the 
potential impact of RICO on divorce law,226 the potential impact of the 
ADA on family law,227 the ICWA,228 the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief 
Act,229 tax issues pertaining to divorce,23o bankruptcy issues pertaining to 
217. Id. 
218. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Federalization of Family Law, 16 J. Am. 
Acad. Matrimonial Law., No.1 (1999). 
219. American Bar Association, The Federalization of Family Law, 23 Fam. Advoc., No.4 
(Spring 2001). 
220. DeboralI Greenberg Baron, Student Author, The Many Faces of Child Support Modifica-
tion, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 259 (1999); Meche1ene DeMaria, Student Author, Juris-
dictional Issues under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial 
Law. 243 (1999); Laura W. Morgan, A Federal Hand in Child Support, 23 Fam. Advoc. 10 
(Spring 2001); Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support-A Shift in the Ruling 
Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of "Family Law", 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimo-
nial Law. 195 (1999); Rebecca Spencer, Student Author, Using Social Security Benefits as a 
Credit Towards a Child Support Obligation, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 223 (1999). 
221. Carlton D. Stansbury, A National Blanket of Health-Care Coverage, 23 Fam. Advoc. 19 
(Spring 2001). 
222. Gary Shulhulm, QDROs -The Ticking Bomb, 23 Fam. Advoc. 26 (Spring 2001) 
("QDRO" means "Qualified Domestic Relations Order."). 
223. Richard E. Crouch, An Intricate Maze of Child-Snatching Statutes, 23 Fam. Advoc. 29 
(Spring 2001). 
224. Howard Davidson, Finding Safe Harbor for Abused and Neglected Children, 23 Fam. 
Advoc. 34 (Spring 2001). 
225. Russell M. Coombs, Child Custody and Visitation by Non-Parents under the New Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act: A Rerun of Seize-and-Run, 16 J. Am. 
Acad. Matrimonial Law. 1 (1999). 
226. H. Joseph Gitlin, The Divorcing Spouse as Racketeer, 23 Fam. Advoc. 40 (Spring 2001) 
("RICO" means "Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations."). 
227. Warren R. Howard, The ADA as "FED" Herring, 23 Fam. Advoc. 42 (Spring 2001) 
("ADA" means "Americans with Disabilities Act."). 
228. Cheila D. Corbine & Wendy He1gemo, When the Family is Native American, 23 Fam. 
Advoc. 45 (Spring 2001) ("ICWA" means "Indian Child Welfare Act."). 
229. Gerald Martin Zopp, Jr., Protecting Soldiers . .. From the Spouses, 23 Fam. Advoc. 46 
(Spring 2001). 
230. Melvyn B. Frumkes, Effect ofTRA 1997 and RARA 1998 on Divorce Taxation, 16 J. Am. 
Acad. Matrimonial Law. 121 (1999). 
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divOfce,231 domestic violence,232 a listing of federal statutes relating to fam-
ily law issues?33 and an annotated bibliography of articles dealing with 
federal law governing family law issues?34 
Professor Linda Elrod, the editor of the American Bar Association's 
Family Law Section scholarly journal, has stated: 
During the last thirty years, federal legislation has affected nearly 
every area of family law: establishing and enforcing child sup-
port; child custody jurisdiction; abortion, childbirth, and family 
planning; foster care and adoption; bankruptcy; health insurance 
for dependents; pensions; recognition of marriages; family vio-
lence; tax; family leave policies; and parental rights?35 
Some of this has come through welfare legislation236 and, recently, 
domestic violence laws?37 Thus, "the number and variety of federal inter-
ventions in what until recently were generally considered local matters has 
increased at an accelerating rate.'.z38 State regulation of family law is 
surfeited with "federal legislation with their alphabetical jungle from ADA 
[Americans with Disabilities Act], ICARA [International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act], UCCJA [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act] [sic] to 
IPKCA [International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act], PRWORA [Profes-
sional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act], VAWA 
[Violence Against Women Act], and USFSP [Uniformed Services Former 
231. Jeffry H. Gallet & Robert Z. Dobrish, The Bankruptcy Automatic Stay: It's Not the End 
of the World-Or of the Case, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 173 (1999); Jeffry H. Gallet & 
Bonnie R. Cohen-Gallet, Avoiding the Discharge of Legal Fees in Bankruptcy, 16 J. Am. Acad. 
Matrimonial Law. 165 (1999). 
232. Leonard Karp & Laura C. Belleau, Federal Law and Domestic Violence: The Legacy of 
the Violence Against Women Act, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 173 (1999). 
233. Federal Statutes Relating to Family Law, 23 Fam. Advoc. 12 (Spring 2001). 
234. Mary Kay Kisthardt & Nancy Levit, Federalization of Family Law Annotated Bibliogra-
phy, 1995-2000, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 299 (2000). 
235. Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a Quest for Policy, 33 
Fam. L. Q. 843, 847-48 (1999). 
236. Charlotte L. Allen, Federalization of Child Support: Twenty Years and Counting, 73 
Mich. BJ. 660-61 (1994) (noting federal takeover of traditionally state child support since 1980); 
Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 229, 229-30 (2000) (noting 
that the wall separating family law from welfare law has "become more porous" in recent years); 
Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Student Author, Permanency at What Cost? Five Years of Imprudence 
under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 617, 
628 (2002) ("[TJhe federal government has had increased influence over state family and welfare 
policy through federal grants conditioned on state plans that follow federal guidelines."). 
237. See generally William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise 
in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 
1139, 1142 (1996) (concluding that "by federalizing an area of law that state courts are more 
capable of adjudicating, Congress has seriously misallocated federal judicial resources"); Michelle 
W. Easterling, For Better or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic Violence, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 
933,953 (1996) ("A better method ... would be to encourage the states to create laws to combat 
domestic abuse."). 
238. Banfield, supra n. 167, at 1. 
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Spouses Protection Act]."239 More recently we have family-impacting 
amendments regulating veterans benefits, unemployment compensation, 
Social Security, bankruptcy, pensions, housing, immigration.240 Thus, Con-
gress as well as the federal courts have contributed to the erosion of federal-
ism in family law. 
C. DOMA and Federalism in Family Law 
One of the most interesting forays of the federal government into a 
matter of family law is the federal DOMA,241 which provides that states 
may choose for themselves whether to recognize same-sex marriages from 
other states, and defines "marriage" for the purpose of federal law as only 
the union of a man and a woman. The latter provision is relevant to the 
family federalism debate because, somewhat ironically, that "conservative" 
federal provision defines marriage as male-female for purpose of federal 
law, rather than incorporating or deferring to state definitions of mar-
riage,242 and critics have asserted that it violates the principle of federalism 
in family law.243 Because the sustainability of DOMA is crucial to the ar-
guments over the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment,244 it merits brief 
analysis here. 
Professor Libby Adler described the intricacy of DOMA when she 
noted: 
DOMA presents a complicated blend of an exception to, and a 
reaffirmation of, the [federalism in family law] rule. It presents 
an exception to the usual view that the law of marriage belongs to 
the states just by being a federal law. This is DOMA-the-excep-
tion. At the same time, DOMA affirms the rule by reasserting 
state control over the law of marriage ... [and] no pesky federal 
constitutional requirement will require states to recognize a same-
239. Robbins, supra n. 183, at 4 (The UCCIA is not federal law, but a uniform state law. 
However, the federal IPKPA based on the UCCIA is federal law.). 
240. Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 Colum. I. Gender & L. 197,213 n. 57 (citing 
federal statutes). 
241. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.c. § 1738(c) (2000). 
242. 1 U.S.c. § 7. 
243. See e.g. Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic 
Relations Conflicts Law, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 1063, 1075 (1999) (arguing that DOMA unconsti-
tutionally infringes upon state sovereignty); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and 
the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1435 (1997) (arguing that the 
definition of marriage for federal law must be ascertained by state law); Mark Strasser, Mission 
Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the Imposition of Stigma, 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights I. 
1, 17 (2000) (Congress exceeded its constitutional powers and violated federalism in enacting 
DOMA) [hereinafter Strasser, Mission Impossible]; Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of 
Federalism, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 457, 469 (1998) ("DOMA has been championed as an example 
of federalism at work. However, DOMA is hardly that. . . . DOMA does the exact opposite.") 
[hereinafter Strasser, DOMA]; Toussaint, supra n. 6 (asserting that DOMA is an attempt to regu-
late morality, which assumes a police power that the federal government does not have). 
244. See supra, nn. 108-11 and accompanying text. 
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sex marriage. . . . [Thus,] DOMA-the-exception affmns the 
rule."245 
The definition of marriage for federal law in DOMA simply clarifies 
that the terms "marriage" and "spouse," when used in federal laws, do not 
include same-sex unions. It defines what those marriage terms mean when 
used in federal law only. That is a routine legislative function. DOMA 
does not impose its federal definition of marriage upon any state or state 
law, nor does it bar any state from choosing to legalize same-sex marriage, 
if it chooses. Rather, it only provides that if a state chooses to legalize 
same-sex marriage within its own jurisdiction, that will not force the federal 
government to use that radical definition of marriage in federal programs 
and laws. That is a straightforward application of federalism, preserving 
the state regulation of· domestic relations for its purposes, and preserving 
the federal regulation of federal programs and policies in conformity with 
congressional policy. 
The terms "marriage" and "spouse" are, and for centuries have been, 
used and defined in many federal laws. It is centuries too late now to say 
that it violates federalism in family law for Congress to define terms of 
familial relations. DOMA's definition of marriage as the union of a man 
and a woman is an accurate reflection of more than two hundred years of 
federal policy and congressional intent. All existing federal laws that refer 
to marriage and marital partners were passed when same-sex marriages 
were unknown, and many were passed when homosexual relations were 
criminally prohibited by all the states and punished in federal law as well. 
Thus, it is beyond reasonable dispute that Congress has never actually in-
tended to include same-sex unions when it used the terms "marriage" and 
"spouses." DOMA embodies quite accurately the actual historical intent 
and expectation of Congress and federal law generally that when these mar-
riage terms are used in federal laws, same-sex couples were not intended to 
be included,z46 
Of course, DOMA does not prevent Congress from later changing its 
mind and treating same-sex unions as marriages if it so desires. For pur-
poses of specific legislation, such as tax, employment benefits, housing, 
etc., Congress may define the terms of "marriage" and "spouse" to include 
same-sex couples, if it chooses. DOMA merely states the baseline, the de-
fault rule, that applies in the absence of countervailing specific congres-
sional intent. 
Thus, DOMA is really a neutrality act, designed to prevent the misuse 
of federal law to force same-sex marriage upon the states without their own 
consent, or upon federal laws and programs without Congress' consent. 
DOMA protects our federalism, the structure of our liberties, against those 
245. Adler, supra n. 240, at 209. 
246. See suprann. 86-93 and accompanying text. 
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who would manipulate federal laws to force same-sex marriage upon the 
people of the states and the people of the United States without the approval 
of their elected representatives in Congress.247 
The problem with DOMA is that it is very unpopular with academics 
who have significant influence with the judicial branch. Many law review 
articles and essays have been written asserting that DOMA is unconstitu-
tional. While the better reasoned analysis-from both liberals and conserv-
atives-maintains that DOMA is constitutiona1,248 DOMA clearly is 
vulnerable until the U.S. Supreme Court upholds its provisions. If DOMA 
were invalidated in any significant part, the basis for protection of federal-
ism in family law would be gravely impaired. 
V. How WOULD PASSAGE OF THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
AFFECT FEDERALISM IN FAMILY LAW? 
Recent developments have significantly altered the equation with re-
gard to the potential effect of passage of the Federal Marriage Amendment 
upon federalism. 
A. Recent Developments Suggesting the Need for the Federal Marriage 
Amendment 
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, by 
a vote of 4-3, ruled that as a matter of Massachusetts state constitutional 
law marriage cannot be limited to male-female couples, and that the state 
must allow same-sex couples to marry. The court stayed its ruling in Good-
ridge v. Dept. of Public Health,249 for 180 days to allow the legislature to 
address the matter. The Massachusetts Senate leadership proposed a bill to 
create Vermont-style "civil unions" with all of the legal status, rights, and 
benefits of marriage for same-sex couples, but without the label of "mar-
247. See generally H.R. Subcomm. on the Const. of the Jud. Comm., Hearing on H.R. 3396: 
Defense of Marriage Act, 104th Congo 158-87 (May 15, 1996) (statement and prepared statement 
of Professor Lynn D. Wardle); and Statement and Prepared Statement of Professor Lynn D. War-
dle in the Defense of Marriage Act, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, 104 Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 1740, July 11, 1996 (S. Hrg. 104-553) at 23-42. 
248. See Sen. Jud. Comm., Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Mar-
riage, 108th Congo (Mar. 23, 2004) (Statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein); Subcomm. on the 
Const., Civ. Rights and Prop. Rights of the Jud. Comm., Judicial Activism v. Democracy: What 
are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the JudicialInvalida-
tion of Traditional Marriage Laws?, 108th Congo (Mar. 3, 2004) (prepared testimony of Lea 
Brilmayer); Hearing on H.R. 3396: Defense of Marriage Act, supra n. 247, at 158-87; Statement 
and Prepared Statement of Professor Lynn D. Wardle in the Defense of Marriage Act, Hearing 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 104 Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 1740, 
July 11, 1996 (S. Hrg. 104-553) at 23-42. 
249. 798 N.E.2d 970. For a more extensive discussion of Goodridge, see Lynn D. Wardle, 
The Judiciary of Massachusetts, 14 B.u. J.L. & Pub. Policy _ (forthcoming 2005). 
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riage."250 Then the Senate filed a special proceeding with the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court seeking an advisory opinion (allowed under a 
unique provision of the Massachusetts Constitution) on whether that "civil 
union" scheme would satisfy the requirements of the Goodridge ruling. On 
February 3, 2004, in Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,251 again by a 4-
3 vote, the Justices ruled that creating civil unions for same-sex couples, but 
forbidding them to marry, "violates the equal protection and due process 
requirements of the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights . . . . The bill maintains an unconstitutional, 
inferior, and discriminatory status for same-sex couples."252 
Following the rejection by the court of civil unions, the Massachusetts 
legislature, on March 29, 2004, passed a proposed constitutional amend-
ment that, if reconfirmed and ratified, would ban gay marriages but recog-
nize civil unions.253 House 3190, as amended, declares as constitutional 
law that "only the union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recog-
nized as a marriage in the commonwealth," but also provides that "[t]wo 
persons of the same sex shall have the right to form a civil union."254 How-
ever, the Massachusetts procedure for amending the state constitution is 
very long, cumbersome, difficult, slow, and anti-democratic. Before this 
amendment becomes effective, it must be reconfirmed by the next Massa-
chusetts legislature, at the earliest 2005, and then it must be ratified by the 
250. Mass. Sen. Bill No. 2175, An Act Relative to Civil Unions (2003) (full text available at 
http://www.massnews.coml20043ditions/tjanuary 10 11204_mn_thejollowing_is_the_civiL 
union_bill_for_which_senate_travaglini.shtrnl) (accessed Apr. 4, 2005). 
251. 802 N.E.2d 566. 
252. [d. at 572. 
253. Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban: Romney to Seek Stay of SJC 
Order, Boston Globe Al (Mar. 30, 2004); see also Jill Schachner Chanen, The National Pulse, 
Gay Marriages Halted, But 3,000 Unions Upheld: Oregon Judge Urges Legislature to Recognize 
Rights of Same-Sex Couples, 3 No. 17 ABA J. E-Report 5, at'll 2 (Apr. 30, 2004). 
254. Mass. H. 3190, The Proposal for a Legislative Amendment to the Constitution Relative to 
the Affirmation of Marriage in Journal of the Senate in Joint Session, http://www.state.ma.us/ 
legis/journal/jsj032904.htrn (Mar. 29, 2004). The text of the amendment reads: 
The unified purpose of this Article is both to define the institution of civil marriage and 
to establish civil unions to provide same-sex persons with entirely the same benefits, 
protections, rights, privileges and obligations as are afforded to married persons, while 
recognizing that under present federal law benefits same-sex persons in civil unions will 
be denied federal benefits available to married persons. 
It being the public policy of this Commonwealth to protect the unique relationship 
of marriage, only the union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a 
marriage in the commonwealth. Two persons of the same sex shall have the right to 
form a civil union if they otherwise meet the requirements set forth by law for marriage. 
Civil unions for same sex persons are established by the Article and shall provide en-
tirely the same benefits, protections, rights, privileges and obligations that are afforded 
to persons married under the law of the commonwealth. All laws applicable to marriage 
shall also apply to civil unions. 
This Article is self-executing, but the general court may enact laws not inconsistent with anything 
herein contained to carry out the purpose of this Article. 
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people at the next general election, which would be in November 2006, at 
the earliest.255 
On Monday, May 17, 2004, the I80-day stay in Massachusetts ex-
pired,256 and same-sex couples began to get marriage licenses in Massachu-
setts by the hundreds.257 In Cambridge alone 220 marriage licenses were 
granted to same-sex couples,258 and it has been estimated that 2,500 mar-
riage licenses were issued to same-sex couples in Massachusetts in the first 
week of legal same-sex marriages in May.259 
However, a 90-year-old anti-marriage-evasion statute in Massachusetts 
forbids the celebration or validity of marriages involving citizens of other 
states that are forbidden in those states. It provides: "No marriage shall be 
contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and intending to con-
tinue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if 
contracted in such other jurisdiction, and every marriage contracted in this 
commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and void."260 Any such 
marriages that are contracted in Massachusetts are "null and void" as a mat-
ter of Massachusetts law.261 The Governor of Massachusetts ordered city 
clerks who issue marriage licenses to determine if couples seeking to marry 
are non-residents and has ordered clerks not to issue marriage licenses to 
non-resident same-sex couples?62 A Massachusetts trial court rejected a 
challenge to this law filed by advocates of same-sex marriage. 263 
255. Mass. Const. art. XLVrn, part I. 
256. Governor Romney wanted to ask the state supreme court to stay its order until after the 
amendment is voted upon, but the Democrat state attorney general, a blatant supporter of same-
sex unions, refused to do so. Several state legislators have filed suit in the state courts, and a pro-
family organization has filed suit in federal court to block Goodridge from taking effect. 
257. See Alan Cooperman & Jonathan Finer, Gay Couples Marry in Massachusetts, Wash. 
Post Al (May 18,2004) ("More than 600 gay couples rushed to town halls and courthouses across 
Massachusetts on Monday and emerged to cheering crowds, live bands and rice-throwing relatives 
as the state became the first in the nation to allow same-sex marriages .... 227 [gay] couples had 
filed papers [to marry] in Cambridge, 154 in Provincetown, 113 in Northampton, 99 in Boston, 65 
in Worcester, 37 in Somerville, and scores more elsewhere. Some also dashed to court to obtain 
waivers of the three-day waiting period for a marriage license .... Provincetown and Worcester 
reponed the most same-sex weddings-about 30 each-and Cambridge had 22."); Jonathan Finer, 
Marriage License Is Just a Start, Wash. Post A3 (May 19, 2004) (Cambridge City Clerk 
processed 220 applications for marriage licenses on Monday, more than any other city, but turned 
away two nonresidents who said they did not intend to move to Massachusetts); Cheryl Wetzstein, 
Homosexuals 'Marry' in Massachusetts, Wash. Times Al (May 18, 2004). 
258. Cooperman & Finer, supra n. 257, at A3. 
259. Christine MacDonald & Bill Dedman, About 2,500 Gay Couples Sought Licenses in 1st 
Week, Boston Globe Al (June 17,2004); see generally infra nn. 262-69 and accompanying text. 
260. Mass. Gen. Stats. ch. 207, § 11 (1998). 
261. Id. 
262. Yvonne AbralIam & Raphael Lewis, Romney Turns to AG for Halt to Licensing: Targets 
Marriage by Gay Outsiders, Boston Globe Al (May 21, 2004). 
263. Jonathan Finer, Marriage License Is Just a Start, supra n. 257; Dan Ring, Court Bars 
Nuptials for Out-o/State Gays, The Republican (Springfield, Mass.) A6 (Aug. 19, 2004) ("A 
judge yesterday approved Gov. W. Mitt Romney's use of a.nearly century-old law to ban out-of-
state gay couples from marrying in Massachusetts, saying the Romney administration is treating 
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Massachusetts is not the only state where activist judges have at-
tempted to judicially mandate same-sex marriage or civil unions. Good-
ridge was preceded by decisions of the state supreme courts of Hawaii264 
and of Vermont,265 and by a trial court decision in Alaska all favoring legal-
ization of same-sex marriage or civil unions. A short time after the Good-
ridge decision, a state trial court in Oregon ordered the legalization of 
same-sex civil unions or marriage,266 and two trial courts in Washington 
state held the state DOMA to be unconstitutionaI,267 In early 2005 a trial 
court in New York ordered the legalization of same-sex marriage.268 Like-
wise, a federal judge in Nebraska ruled that the state constitutional amend-
ment barring same-sex marriage or civil unions appears to violate the 
federal constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder. 269 
Elsewhere, many gay couples and supporters of same-sex marriage 
have not been content to wait for change to come through the processes of 
legislative or judicial redefinition of marriage. Over 4,000 marriage li-
censes were issued to same-sex couples in California alone,270 before the 
state supreme court finally ordered a halt and, six months later, nullified the 
marriages,z71 In Oregon it was reported that approximately 3,000 same-sex 
couples obtained marriage licenses in Multnomah County (the Portland 
area) before a state court ordered county officials to stop issuing the 
licenses to same-sex couples,z72 Public officials in New Paltz, New 
all couples equally under the law."); Associated Press, Judge Backs Gay Marriage Law oj 1913: It 
Bars Out-oj-State Couples from Marrying, Belleville News-Democrat (ill.) (Aug. 20, 2004) ("A 
state judge on Wednesday rejected a challenge of a 1913 law barring out-of-state gay couples 
from marrying in Massachusetts, where residents have had that first-in-the-nation right since May. 
Superior Court Judge Carol Ball denied a request by eight gay couples from other states for a 
preliminary injunction blocking Massachusetts from enforcing the law, which prohibits marriages 
that would not be legal in couples' home states."). 
264. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44. 
265. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864. 
266. Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences U., 971 P.2d 435, 447-48 (Or. App. 1998). 
267. See Anderson v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Aug. 
4, 2004); Castle v. Wash., No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Sept. 7, 2004). 
268. Helen Peterson, Judge: Gay Marriage Okay'll 1 (Feb. 5, 2005), http://www.nydailynews. 
com (accessed Mar. 31, 2005). 
269. Citizens Jor Equal Protec., Inc., v. Brunning, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009-10 (D. Neb. 
2003). 
270. Suzanne Herel, Rona Marech, & ilene Lelchuk, Numbers Put Face on a Phenomenon: 
Most Who Married Are Middle-Aged, Have College Degrees, S.P. Chron. 'll'll 1-2 (Mar. 18,2004) 
(available at http://sfgate.com!cgi-biniarticle.cgi?file=/c/al2004/03/18IMNGTB5MUOll.DTL) 
("There were doctors, lawyers and-yes-even an Indian 'tribal chairwoman.' The 4,037 same-
sex couples who obtained marriage licenses in San Francisco hail from 46 states and eight other 
countries, are highly educated, range in age from 18 to 83 but generally are middle-aged, and 
represent hundreds of occupations."). 
271. Lockyer v. City & County oj S.F., 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (Cal. 2004) (Mayor Newsom's action 
was ultra vires and improper, and that marriages of same-sex couples performed under those 
licenses were null and void). 
272. Chanen, supra n. 253; News24.com, Judge Halts Gay Marriages'll 2, http://www.news 
24.comlNews241W0rldlNews/0,6U9,2-1O-1462_1515383,00.htrnl (Apr. 21, 2004) ("About three 
thousand licenses were issued to same-sex couples, she [Multnomah County commission chairper-
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York,273 and Sandoval County, New Mexic0274 also issued several dozen 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples before being stopped. 
B. The Supreme Court Has Already Imposed Some Constitutional 
Boundaries on State Definition and Regulation of Marriage. 
It is significant that the Supreme Court of the United States has invali-
dated state laws regulating marriage four times in the past 37 years.z75 In 
one sense it might be said that those decisions "defined" marriage as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law, although the Court did not purport to de-
fine marriage, but instead was interpreting provisions of the Constitution 
protecting individual rights or specific guarantees mentioned in or derived 
from the Fourteenth Amendment, which conflicted with the state marriage 
laws. The Court imposed in each case some constitutional boundaries on 
the state definition or regulation of marriage. Those decisions establish that 
"the right to marry" includes an unwritten, fundamental constitutional inter-
est, and that some laws that interfere with persons getting married in some 
son Diane Linn] said, adding that the judge ordered the state to 'fully honour' them."); Harriet 
Chiang, The Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage, After the Wedding Bells, Gays Face Maze of Legal 
Obstacles, S.F. Chron. Al (Apr. 26, 2004) ("an Oregon judge ordered Mu1tnomah County offi-
ciaIs last week to stop issuing same-sex marriage licenses but told the state to vaIidate the mar-
riages of the 3,000 gay and lesbian couples to whom the county had already issued licenses"). 
273. Thomas Crampton & Christine Hauser, Gay Marriage Debate Shifts to Small New York 
Village, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2004) (available at http://www.nytimes.coml2004/02/27/nyregion/ 
27CND-P ALT.html?ex=1095048000&en=a3311e1ad6074e67 &ei=5070&hp); 70nline.com, New 
Paltz Mayor Bannedfrom Performing More Same-Sex Marriage Ceremonies 'lI1, http://abclocaI. 
go.comlwabc/news/wabc_030604~aymarriagel.html (Mar. 6, 2004) ("A state judge issued a 
month-long ban preventing [New Paltz] Mayor West from performing more ceremonies."); Asso-
ciated Press, NYC Mayor Favors Civil Unions Not Gay Marriage 'lI5, (Mar. 6, 2004) (available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.comlidl4397854) ("The mayor of New PaItz, north of New York City, 
performed 25 same-sex ceremonies a week ago. Mayor Jason West faces 19 criminaI counts and 
could face jail time, but agreed to abide by a ruling that temporarily barred him from performing 
more same-sex marriages."). 
274. John Ritter, S.F. to Resume Issuing Gay Marriage License Today, USA Today'll 14, 
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nation/2oo4-02-22-gay-marriage-usaCx.htm (Feb. 22, 2004) ("In 
Sandoval County outside Albuquerque, county clerk Victoria Dunlap said the law was vague and 
began issuing same-sex licenses last week. SeveraI dozen gay and lesbian couples were married 
before New Mexico Attorney General Patricia Madrid declared the licenses invalid."); Associated 
Press, Gay Couples Marry in New Mexico 'lI'll 1-2, http://www.cnn.coml2004IUS/Southwestl02/20/ 
samesex.marriage.nm.apl (Feb. 20, 2002) ("A county clerk issued marriage licenses Friday to at 
least 15 gay couples, some of whom then exchanged vows outside the courthouse, and dozens 
more same-sex couples lined up for a chance to tie the knot. A sign-up list at the SandovaI County 
courthouse grew to 38 couples after county clerk Victoria Dunlap announced she would issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples."). 
275. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (antimiscegenation laws unconstitutionaI); Bod-
die, 401 U.S. at 380-81 (1971) (divorce filing fee for indigents unconstitutionaI); Zablocki, 434 
U.S. at 388-91 (1978) (law restricting marriage by deadbeat dads unconstitutional); Turner, 482 
U.S. at 96-99 (1987) (state prison's near-ban on prisoner marriages unconstitutionaI); see gener-
ally Wardle, supra n. 78; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and 
Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev.463, 507-11 
(1983). 
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circumstances will not be upheld unless significantly related to very impor-
tant state interests (under not-quite-but-almost-strict-scrutiny). Some schol-
ars and judges have read those decisions quite broadly,276 although the 
Supreme Court itself has not become particularly "activist" in expanding 
the "right to marry" doctrine,z77 
The leading example is Loving v. Virginia. 278 In that case the Court 
held, notwithstanding federalism in family law and deference to the states 
in marriage regulation, that laws defining marriage so as to forbid blacks 
and whites from intermarrying were unconstitutional, both as a matter of 
equal protection doctrine and as a matter of the due-process-protected con-
stitutional right to marry ,z79 Likewise, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court 
held that marriage rules barring "deadbeat dads" who had failed to pay 
child-support obligations could not be delayed in marrying until they 
showed that they would pay the child support owing.280 In Boddie v. Con-
necticut divorce filings fees that were not waived for indigent persons were 
invalidated because they interfered with the constitutionally protected mar-
riage interest.281 And in Turner v. Safley, the Court held that even state 
prison regulations that denied incarcerated prisoners the right to marry 
without a precise and directly applicable legitimate penalogical or security 
justification violated the Constitution,z82 In all four cases, the Court used 
the Constitution to override state marriage regulations. Thus, federalism in 
family law does not preclude some constitutional protection for, or limits 
upon, some aspects of marriage,z83 
276. See e.g. Amy Doherty, Constitutional Methodology and Same-Sex Marriage, 11 J. Con-
temp. Leg. Issues 110, 112 (2000) (concluding that if "prisoners, bad parents, and interracial 
couples have a fundamental right to get married that the State cannot restrict arbitrarily or for 
illegitimate motives ... lilt would seem to follow that a same-sex couple has a right to get married 
that the State cannot restrict for any but compelling reasons); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists out of 
the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions against Polygamy Are Unconstitu-
tional under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 Ga. St. L. Rev. 691, 753-57 (2001) (arguing that the 
right to marry, combined with free exercise rights, creates a hybrid right under Smith for polyga-
mous marriages); see also Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" Is Harmless Incest: Deter-
mining the Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity without Resorting to State 
Incest Statutes, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 262, 265-72 (2000) (concluding that the fundamental 
right to marry encompasses certain marriages currently banned for reasons of relation by affinity). 
277. Wardle, supra n. 78, at 336-46; see generally, Donald L. Beschle, Defining the Scope of 
the Constitutional Right to Marry: More than Tradition, Less than Unlimited Autonomy, 70 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 39,40 (1994) (stating that "most courts lean toward the narrow view ... while most 
commentators seem to favor the broader view"). 
278. 388 U.S. 1. 
279. Id. at 12. 
280. 434 U.S. at 390-91. 
281. 401 U.S. at 386. 
282. 482 U.S. at 81. 
283. See generally Wardle, supra n. 78 (the Court has addressed marriage issues in dozens of 
cases since 1790, but has only decided constitutional marriage issues four times, beginning with 
Loving). 
2004] THE PROPOSED FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 191 
Loving could be criticized on the same federalism in family law 
grounds that have been raised by opponents to the FMA. But nearly 40 
years later, it is clear that Loving had no significant effect upon federalism 
in family law. So the FMA proposes to do by constitutional amendment no 
more than what the Supreme Court has been doing by judicial interpretation 
for decades. 
C. Nine Existing Constitutional Threats to Federalism in Family Law. 
The doctrine of federalism in family law is in jeopardy from at least 
nine constitutional and related claims, arguments, and positions that are cur-
rently and aggressively pursued by advocates of same-sex marriage in the 
United States and being pressed by judges who favor them. Acceptance of 
any of these legal positions will have a profound, detrimental effect upon 
the viability of the federalism doctrine. Taken together, these legal claims 
already have significantly weakened and now seriously threaten the very 
survival of federalism in family law in American legal doctrine. Federalism 
in family law will not survive these powerful, growing doctrinal influences 
intact unless some strong, corrective legal response at the level of constitu-
tional law is made. These nine threatening claims are summarized below. 
First, equal protection claims are seeking to constitutionally mandate 
same-sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex unions threaten feder-
alism in family law. Such equality claims based on federal and state equal 
protection clauses and state cognate clauses like the "common benefits" 
clause have already been accepted by courts in Hawaii,284 Alaska,285 Ver-
mont,286 Massachusetts,287 Oregon,288 Washington,289 and by individual 
dissenting or concurring justices or judges in Washington, D.C.290 and New 
York,z91 These claims assert that it is a denial of equal protection of the 
laws to refuse to allow same-sex couples to marry or to enjoy all of the 
rights and benefits of marriage in some other domestic union. If this posi-
tion prevails, all states will have to legalize same-sex marital unions be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all states. 
Second, due process claims seeking to constitutionally mandate same-
sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex unions threaten federalism in 
family law. These claims assert that it is a denial of due process of law to 
refuse to allow same-sex couples to marry or to enjoy all of the rights and 
284. Baehr, 852 P.2d 44. 
285. Brause, 1998 WL 88743. 
286. Baker, 744 A2d 864. 
287. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565. 
288. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447-48; Li v. Or., No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Cir. Ct. 
2004). 
289. Castle, 2004 WL 1985215. 
290. Dean, 653 A2d at 333-61 (Ferren, J., dissenting). 
291. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989); Raum v. Rest. Assocs., Inc., 252 AD.2d 
369, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dist. 1998) (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting). 
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benefits of marriage in some other domestic union. Courts in Alaska,292 
Oregon,293 and Washington294 have already embraced this argument. If this 
position prevails, all states will have to legalize same-sex unions because 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all states. 
Third, full faith and credit claims seeking to constitutionally mandate 
that all states recognize and accept the importation of same-sex marriage or 
marriage-equivalent same-sex unions threaten federalism in family law. 
These claims assert that it is a denial of full faith and credit295 for any state 
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages and marriage judgments from 
other states. Courts in New York,296 Iowa,297 and Washingon298 have ac-
cepted this argument. If this position prevails, all states will have to accept 
the importation of same-sex marriages because the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause applies to all states. 
Fourth, gay advocates asserting bill of attainder claims seek to consti-
tutionally mandate same-sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex un-
ions and that threatens federalism in family law?99 These claims assert that 
it is a bill of attainder to refuse to allow same-sex couples to marry or to 
enjoy all of the rights and benefits of marriage in some other domestic 
union. If this position prevails, all states will have to legalize same-sex 
marital unions because the Bill of Attainder Clause is part of the Constitu-
tion and applies to all states?OO 
Fifth, establishment of religion claims seeking to constitutionally man-
date same-sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex unions threaten 
federalism in family law. These claims assert that it is an establishment of 
religion to allow only male-female couples to marry or to enjoy all of the 
rights and benefits of marriage in some other domestic union. For example, 
[p]rofessor [William N.] Eskridge [has] argued that several con-
stitutional doctrines are violated when the religious aspect of mar-
riage dictates the legal policy of who has access to the marital 
institution. He suggested that First Amendment restrictions 
292. Brause, 1998 WL 88743. 
293. Li, 2004 WL 1258167. 
294. Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447. 
295. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
296. Raum, 252 A.D.2d 369. 
297. See generally Lambda Legal, Alons v. Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, http:// 
www.lambdalegal.orglcgi-binliowalcases/record?record=203 (accessed Apr. 23, 2005); Lambda 
Legal, Iowa Supreme Court to Hear Oral Argument Friday in Lesbian Civil Union Dissolution 
Case, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-biniiowalnews/press.html?record=1605(Jan.ll. 2005). 
298. See supra, n. 289. 
299. Citizens for Equal Protec., Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004; id. F. Supp. 2d _, 2005 WL 
1126834 (D. Neb., May 12, 2005) (No. 4:03CV3155). 
300. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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against the establishment of religion prohibit the use of religious 
beliefs as a justification for prohibiting same-sex marriages?Ol 
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If this position prevails, all states will have to legalize same-sex mari-
tal unions because the First Amendment applies to all states. 
Sixth, free exercise of religion claims seeking to constitutionally man-
date same-sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex unions threaten 
federalism in family law. These claims assert that it is a denial of freedom 
of religion to refuse to allow same-sex couples to marry or to enjoy all of 
the rights and benefits of marriage in some other domestic union. One ac-
tivist law professor has argued: 
The Court has made quite clear that the 'Free Exercise Clause 
simply cannot be understood to require the Government to con-
duct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the relig-
ious beliefs of particular citizens.' Even if the religious 
sentiments of some would be offended by recognizing civil un-
ions or same-sex marriages, that alone would not suffice to justify 
the state's refusal to recognize such unions?02 
Constitutional religion claims have been asserted by parties seeking 
judicial legalization of same-sex marriage in several cases.303 If this posi-
tion prevails, all states will have to legalize same-sex marital unions be-
cause the First Amendment applies to all states. 
Seventh, privileges and immunities claims seeking to constitutionally 
mandate same-sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex unions 
threaten federalism in family law. These claims assert that it is a violation 
of privileges and immunities to reserve only for male-female couples the 
legal status of marriage and all of the rights and benefits of marriage. Such 
claims have been recently accepted by two courts in Washington.304 If this 
position prevails, all states will have to legalize same-sex marital unions 
because the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all states. 
Eighth, distortion of rational basis analysis, such as by invoking the 
"mystery" of life and the universe,305 and conclusorily insisting that pre-
serving the institution of conjugal marriage as it has been known for millen-
nia is simply irrational, has the potential to mandate legalizing same-sex 
301. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Conversations about the Intersecting Institutions of Marriage, 4 
Tex. Wes. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1998); see also Josh Friedes, Can Same-Sex Marriages Coexist with 
Religion? 38 New Eng. L. Rev. 533, 536-37 (2004); Cruz, supra n. 4, at 948 n. 117; Vicki L. 
Armstrong, Student Author, Welcome to the 21st Century and the Legalization of Same-Sex Un-
ions, 18 Thomas M. Cooley L. Rev. 85,105-06 (2001); James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconsti-
tutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 Mich. J. Gender & L. 335, 373 (1997). 
302. Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and 
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 597, 606 (2002); see also Friedes, supra n. 301, at 
537-38; Cruz, supra n. 4, at 948. 
303. See e.g. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946, 2003 WL 23119998 (Ind. 
Super. May 7, 2003); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. App. 1973). 
304. Anderson, 2004 WL 1738447 at **3, 11-12; Castle, 2004 WL 1985215 at *16. 
305. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
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marriage. Same-sex marriage advocates have long asserted that it is simply 
irrational to deny gay and lesbian couples to marry. 306 Indeed, that was the 
precise legal justification given by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court for mandating the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state.307 
If that position is accepted by federal courts, all states will be required to 
legalize same-sex marriage because all states are prohibited by the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution from enacting irrational or arbitrary laws. 
Ninth, lawless behavior by gay and lesbian activists and supportive 
politicians has been increasing in the past year as persons demanding the 
legalization of same-sex marriage have opted to take the law into their own 
hands, to bypass the democratic system, and to coerce other lawmakers and 
citizens into acquiescing in the legalization of same-sex marriage. For ex-
ample, the lawlessness of Mayor Gavin Newsom in San Francisco, county 
officials in Multnomah County, Oregon, other mayors and public officials, 
and thousands of gays and lesbians has been noted.308 This kind of lawless-
ness by public officials and tens of thousands of citizens claiming a higher 
mandate than constitutional and democratic processes strikes at the very 
core of the Constitution which is founded upon respect for and submission 
to the rule of law. Such lawless behavior presents a serious threat to consti-
tutional democracy, self-government, and thereby to federalism in family 
law, which means nothing if public officials are not obliged to follow the 
laws or if they can be intimidated, coerced, or corruptly persuaded to ignore 
the laws. 
Additionally, various nonconstitutional legal doctrines also have been 
asserted by advocates of same-sex marriage seeking to persuade judges to 
mandate same-sex marriage or marriage-equivalent same-sex unions that 
threaten federalism in family law. For example, many legal writers have 
asserted that ordinary conflict of laws doctrines (apart from full faith and 
credit) require states to recognize sister-state same-sex marriages or civil 
unions. These claims have been accepted by several courts already.309 
Likewise, many advocates of same-sex marriage have argued that marriage 
statutes in various states must be construed to permit same-sex couples to 
marry.310 If these positions prevail, at least some states will be judicially 
compelled to legalize same-sex marital unions by means which individually 
and in concert with other doctrines, such as Full Faith and Credit claims, 
have serious implications for federalism in family law. 
306. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1419 
(1993); Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 Widener 1. Pub. L. 461 (1995). 
307. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960-61. 
308. See supra nn. 270-74 and accompanying text. 
309. See e.g. Langdan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 196 N.Y. Misc. 2d 440, 449 (Sup. Ct. 
Nassau County 2003). 
310. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969; Baker, 744 A.2d at 886; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: YES ON THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT - To 
BRING A RENAISSANCE AND REVIVAL OF FEDERALISM IN 
FAMILY LAW 
Federalism is a particular kind of "power map" reflecting "socio-eco-
nomic realities in the distribution of political power" and it is also a moral 
compass "reflect[ing] the moral principles underlying polities as re-
gimes."311 Federalism in family law charts a cooperative allocation of gov-
ernmental power and provides a normative guide for our policy makers. 
Yet the doctrine of federalism in family law today has only ambiguous and 
debatable validity. As this article has shown, there is a tension in existing 
federal cases between federalist judicial decisions giving deference to and 
respect for state priority in regulating family relations, and social activist 
judicial decisions overriding and invalidating state laws regulating family 
relations that do not conform to preferred policy images of the ruling 
judges. How those tensions and ambiguities are resolved is tied directly to 
the fate of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. 
Whether the doctrine of federalism in family law should be preserved 
and strengthened (and both the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and 
the proposed nationalization of same-sex marriage recognition rejected), or 
modified and strengthened (as proposed by proponents of the Federal Mar-
riage Amendment), or buried (as implicitly asserted by proponents of same-
sex marriage who seek national imposition of their preferred marriage pol-
icy on the states by judicial decree) depends on whether the doctrine of 
federalism in family law today re-emerges as a real, viable, operative con-
stitutional doctrine. The answer to that question is not yet clear. It is in the 
hands of the Supreme Court and of other federal and state court judges. If 
they ignore, circumvent, curtail, or undermine the doctrine of federalism in 
family law in same-sex marriage cases, and cases involving other same-sex 
family issues, that is likely to lead to a tremendous cultural and constitu-
tional crisis,312 and support for the Federal Marriage Amendment will dra-
311. Daniel J. Elazar, The U.S. Constitution and the American Tradition of Constitution-Mak-
ing, in The Reluctant Pillar: New York and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 3, 5 (Stephen 
L. Schechter ed., Russell Sage College 1987). 
312. See generally Kurtz, Before the Big One, supra n. 49 ("[I]t will be a ... culture-war story 
like no other."); Kurtz, The Right Balance, supra n. 49. "The stonn that will break over America 
after but a single state legalizes gay marriage will surely be a moment of decisive cultural reckon-
ing. In the wake of that first legalization, the battle over gay marriage will be characterized by 
rapidly escalating confrontation, followed by a radical, nation-wide resolution." [d. at'J[ 1. "[TJhe 
nation will be plunged into a furious legal, political, and cultural struggle. The bitter and ongoing 
polarization in even an exceedingly liberal state like Vennont is a clear foreshadowing of the 
conflict to come. As legal and political battles over traveling couples spread from state to state, 
the chaos will multiply." [d. at'J[ 17. Kurtz,Oh, Canada!, supra n. 98, at 'J['J[ 16-17 (The contro-
versy over legalizing same-sex marriage in the United States will be a "bitter[ ]," "sharp," "con-
vuls[ive]," and "drawn out" "cultural battle."). 
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matically grow, perhaps to the level of national constitutional super-
consensus.313 
The Federal Marriage Amendment is addressed to two separate but 
similar problems-the problem of mandatory (inherently overbroad) na-
tional uniformity on such questions as same-sex marriage, civil unions, and 
marital benefits for nonmarital cohabitants, and the problem of judicial ac-
tivism with judges increasingly assuming the role of ultimate dictators of 
state marriage policies. The former is a concern of federalism and the latter 
a matter of separation of powers. When the judges who strike down or 
dictate state marriage policy are federal judges, the two problems are com-
bined, and sometimes confused. So the FMA faces a dilemma of attempt-
ing to preserve federalism in family law while responding to the judicial 
threat to the survival of federalism in family law. 
The drafters of the Federal Marriage Amendment recognize that there 
is a tension between the principles of federalism and of separation of pow-
ers regarding their goal of preventing judicial imposition of same-sex mar-
riage, domestic partnership, and marital benefits. Supporters of the Federal 
Marriage Amendment apparently believe that the need to respond to the 
threat posed by judicial activism to separation of powers, or democratic 
self-government, in matters of marriage policy is greater than the need to 
protect state government control of family law at least with regard to the 
state judges compelling same-sex marriage, creating quasi-marriage unions, 
and ordering marriage benefits for same-sex couples. Thus, the Federal 
Marriage Amendment attempts to impose a national ban on any judicial 
definition of marriage or creation of quasi-marriage unions or extension of 
marital benefits, and in pursuit of the goal of protecting democracy in fam-
ily law policy-making, the Federal Marriage Amendment even overrides 
federalism in regards to same-sex marriage, which would preserve state 
control of the allocation of responsibilities among the judiciary, legislature, 
and executive of any state to the state itself and the people thereof. 
Not all important values need to be constitutionalized. However, when 
basic social institutions and values are threatened, as in the current crisis of 
the judicial movement to mandate legalization of same-sex marriage, the 
process of amending the constitution is an important tool, and may provide 
an effective remedy to the crisis. When the meaning of fundamental social 
entities becomes ambiguous, clarification in constitutional certainty can 
bring peace and restore confidence in the processes and structures of the 
313. Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, The Alaska Marriage 
Amendment: The People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 Alaska L. Rev. 213 (1999) (Contro-
versy "might generate a national movement for a federal marriage amendment. By so doing, it 
may plunge the country into strife over marriage and damage its own credibility as a reliable 
interpreter of the Constitution."); see Kurtz, Before the Big One, supra n. 49 (The conflict result-
ing from efforts to force same-sex marriage on resistant states will ignite a movement to pass the 
Federal Marriage Amendment.). 
2004] THE PROPOSED FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 197 
legal and political system. The constitutions of more than 40 countries and 
several international conventions contain provisions protecting marriage, 
the family, or family life that might be interpreted to forbid same-sex mar-
riage, including more than ten which expressly define marriage as the union 
of a man and a woman?14 
The need today for constitutional protection for family relationships, 
including for exclusively male-female marriage, is becoming increasingly 
apparent. The notion of fundamental rights that is accepted today is much 
greater than the notion of rights that prevailed in 1789, and it could be 
beneficial to explicitly define and protect the notion of marriage upon 
which our constitutional society is built. Rights then were defined by refer-
ence to the threats and abuses that were most prominent. Then the family 
was not threatened, but cruel and unusual punishment, quartering troops in 
homes, and suspension of the right to jury trial were very real and recent 
threats, so those were protected in the Bill of Rights. Using the same test 
for determining fundamental rights, most would agree that the family is a 
threatened institution, and that marriage needs particular protection. If 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, and Alexander Hamil-
ton were alive today, we could expect to see them leading the movement to 
adopt constitutional protection for the institution of conjugal marriage. 
Constitutionalization of family law can occur at the state level as well 
as at the national level. Before 2003, at least six American states had en-
acted constitutional provisions that refer to marriage?lS Between 1998 and 
2002, the citizens of Hawaii, Alaska, Nebraska, and Nevada ratified amend-
ments to the state constitutions that define-:-or explicitly protect legislative 
authority to define-marriage as limited to male-female unions. In late 
2004, thirteen additional states ratified state marriage amendments, with 
majorities averaging better than 2: 1. 316 Proposed state constitutional 
amendments are now pending in a dozen other states. Clearly, many Amer-
icans are comfortable with using a state constitutional amendment to pro-
tect marriage. Whether that would translate into support for a federal 
constitutional amendment remains to be seen, but it certainly seems possi-
ble. From the perspective of federalism in family law, there are significant 
advantages to constitutionalizing the definition or nature of marriage at the 
314. See Scott Borrowman, National Constitutional Provisions Relating to Family and Mar-
riage (Mar. 2005) (listing over 100 national constitutions with family protection provisions) (copy 
in author's possession); MarriageWatch.org, Around the World, International Policy, http://mar-
riagelaw.cua.eduiCornrnunity/internat.cfm (accessed Apr. 22, 2005); Robert Winternute, Sexual 
Orientation and Human Rights: The United States Constitution, the &tropean Convention, and 
the Canadian Charter 112 (Oxford U. Press 1995) (citing German, French, Dutch, and European 
Court of Human Rights decisions upholding under such provisions discrimination between mar-
ried and same-sex couples). 
315. See Alaska Const. art. I § 25; Ariz. Const. art. XX, 'I! 2; Ga. Const. preamble; Haw. 
Const. art. I § 23; N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 1; Utah Const. art. III. 
316. Cheryl Wetzstein, Marriage Amendment Defeat Stirs Questions, Wash. Times A2 (Oct. 
10,2004). 
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state level, so long as federalism in family law is a real, respected, judicially 
protected, and enforced principle. 
While state constitutionalization seems very appropriate under the 
principle of federalism in family law, if that principle is impotent or illu-
sory, merely window dressing, a toothless tiger, it would be foolish to work 
to establish the substantive policy in state constitutional law which could 
easily be overridden and invalidated by activist judges claiming federal 
constitutional pretext for preemption. Thus, the current viability of federal-
ism in family law is critical to the debate over the proposed Federal Mar-
riage Amendment. 
As noted earlier, in June 2003 I delivered a paper at a conference of 
family law professors expressing my criticism of the Federal Marriage 
Amendment and my unwillingness for reasons of federalism to support it 
even though I agreed with its basic purpose and with its substantive mar-
riage principles. However, the radical scope and whirlwind pace of judicial 
activism and gay and lesbian lawlessness (manifested in issuing marriage 
licenses and getting married in defiance of the law, and arrogantly disre-
garding democratic processes for deciding whether to change the law) have 
caused me to change my mind. I now fully support the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment without reservation. 
The choice is clear-either in the next dozen years there will be a 
constitutional rule protecting the institution of conjugal marriage, or there 
will be a constitutional rule forcing all states to create or to recognize-and 
effectively leading to domestic approval of-same-sex marriages. The 
choice is inevitable. There is, and will be, no middle ground. One way or 
the other, the doctrine of federalism in family law is going to be reshaped. 
That is not surprising since we believe in a living Constitution. So the fact 
that federalism in family law needs to be updated to address these new 
circumstances and challenges is not unusual. 
As a firm believer in the value of federalism in family law, the choice 
for me is clear. Adoption of the Federal Marriage Amendment will work 
the least intrusive, least dangerous, least radical alteration of the doctrine of 
federalism in family law. The constitutional positions by which advocates 
of same-sex marriage are seeking to force all states to accept or recognize 
same-sex marriage are much broader, much more far-reaching, much more 
intrusive, and much more threatening to the survival offederalism in family 
law as a viable principle than the narrow and modest adjustments proposed 
by the Federal Marriage Amendment. For that reason, I support passage of 
the Federal Marriage Amendment. If it is ratified, it could signal a revival 
and renaissance of federalism in family law. That would be good for Amer-
ican constitutional law and good for American families. 
